The Scramble for Cambodia - Hun Sen's Cambodia - page 175

stopped logging even if he had wanted to. Profits from the sale of timber, like other forms
of illicit income, were the glue that held the CPP's patronage state together. Logging
generally increased in the run-up to national elections, when the CPP campaign machine
slipped into high gear. The rest of the time, access to the slush fund helped keep power-
ful interests happy and bought the government the loyalty it needed to secure its hold on
power, and hence on further resources. The vicious cycle of Hunsenomics brooked no
reforms—just the creation of new mirages to distract donors from the workings of the
shadow state.
The work-around of choice was economic land concessions (ELCs)—long-term leases
of land for agricultural plantations. ELCs were first introduced in the early 2000s as part
of a government scheme aimed at boosting rural development through large-scale ag-
ribusiness ventures. The catch was that while commercial logging was now banned, ex-
ceptions could be made for companies planning to plant rubber, cashews, cassava, or oth-
er crops in designated ELCs. So exceptions were made everywhere. MAFF would grant
concessions to favored local companies, sometimes working in partnership with a foreign
agribusiness firm. The loggers would then move in and fell the commercially viable trees
in and around the concession area, and the company would fire-hose the local authorities
with kickbacks. More money went upwards. Sometimes a plantation would be established
on the cleared land, as in Prey Lang. Sometimes the concession was simply abandoned
once the timber was sold.
Soon ELCs were being minted with abandon. The Land Law passed in 2001 capped
the size of ELCs at 10,000 hectares, but the limit was often ignored. Some companies
just sliced up large concessions into a series of smaller adjacent plots with near identical
names. The use of ELCs as logging cover took place with the active involvement of the
very authorities charged with policing forest crimes. In August 2003 the agriculture min-
ister Chan Sarun established the Forestry Administration (FA), a mirage-like body which
theoretically had greater powers to enforce the Forestry Law passed in 2002. In practice,
it simply provided a new channel for patronage.
Straightaway Chan Sarun and FA Director General Ty Sokhun convened an auction
for around 500 jobs in the new administration. The pricing scheme took into account
both rank and geographic location. In those provinces with rich forestry resources, the
payoff necessary to secure a top job could be as high as $30,000. Successful candidates
were then required to pay as much as half their income to their superiors. 19 The burdens
of bribery forced many FA staff into debt, creating an even greater motive for them to
squeeze money from their positions. Far from tackling forest crime, the new system actu-
ally incentivized the felling of trees.
Global Witness, the group chosen to oversee Cambodia's forestry management efforts,
quickly made powerful enemies by documenting the extent of official involvement in the