The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 42

Preparedness
Today US preparedness is restricted by treaty and law to defense.
Given recent events, two questions persist regarding the current US
preparedness against a surprise CBW attack. First, to what extent can de-
fensive preparedness be separated from offensive preparedness, and how
do we guard against the crossing of that thin line? Second, given that ac-
tive defense against a CBW attack depends upon forewarning, how con-
fident are we that our intelligence agencies can detect an attack before it
comes or detect the agent after it comes?
Recently, moreover, skepticism has arisen as to whether the US honors
the distinction between offensive and defensive research. The discovery
that BW work was being carried out at the Nevada Test Site has raised
questions among BW scholars and some journalists as to whether this
R&D crosses the thin line between offensive and defensive research. 151
That concern has been raised more sharply in the aftermath of 9/11.
The flurry of activity that followed the shock of 11 September 2001 is
too recent to evaluate, especially since much of the documentation is
classified. The extensive governmental reorganization that accompanied
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security is an ongoing polit-
ical process as various constituencies and organizations jockey for posi-
tion and power. Similarly, an extensive range of costly biodefense mea-
sures have been initiated whose effectiveness cannot yet be determined.
Some of these measures have raised serious concerns in arms control, dis-
armament, and scientific quarters. These concerns have centered upon
the issues of security versus transparency, and the maintenance of a dis-
tinction between defensive and offensive BW work.
How can one know if one's government is pursuing only defensive re-
search? Some secrecy is essential to keeping advanced CBR capabilities
out of the hands of terrorists or violent states. But the danger of the cul-
ture of secrecy is that it can subvert safeguards protecting this frontier.
Hence the paradox: the more dangerous the weapons, the greater the
need for secrecy; but the more dangerous the weapons, the greater the
need for transparency if national policy is to secure the boundary be-
tween offense and defense.
It is impossible to separate completely offensive and defensive re-
search. To know how the enemy can use BW, one must understand the