The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 32

August 1953, stressing the failure in biological warfare preparedness:
“The desired degree of success...inresearch and development in BW
may never be realized.” 121
CBW preparedness continued to lag in the early years of the Eisen-
hower administration. During these years, the Office of the Special Assis-
tant for Science and Technology expressed dissatisfaction with the CBW
program. On 8 May 1958 Herbert Scoville Jr., a member of the BW-CW
Panel, reacted with exasperation at the lack of progress, excoriating the
CmlC. 122
On 30 July 1958 G. B. Kistiakowsky Jr., of the White House Office of
Science and Technology, complained to Dr. J. R. Killian Jr., the president's
special assistant for science and technology, regarding BW preparedness.
He concluded: “The Chemical Corps has no directives authorizing it to
develop weapons and operational doctrines; only to do R&D in BW. It is
very clear that what is now available could be substantially improved by
an effort directed at a specific weapons system.” 123 Almost a year later,
another devastating report was sent to Killian on management problems
within the DOD, including those affecting CBW: “A special management
problem is raised by single Service support of programs that are clearly of
tri-Service interest...Examples of this are found in the BW/CW pro-
gram of the Army.” 124
By the end of the Eisenhower administration, preparedness still lagged.
The report of the Atomic, Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Division
was harsh: “The US does not now have and has not programmed for pro-
curement by 1965 a CW/BW capability adequate either to contribute ef-
fectively to deterring the Soviet Bloc from initiating chemical and biologi-
cal warfare, nor to retaliate effectively if the enemy does initiate.” 125
In the Kennedy years, additional effort was dedicated to the BW pro-
gram as the new administration committed itself to flexible response,
seeking options besides nuclear weapons with which to react to Soviet
aggression. In funding, the CmlC reached its highest point since fiscal
year 1957, although it still had to compete with many other rearmament
programs. 126
The key to improving American preparedness lay in testing. Project
112 centered on CBW. In his mission statement to the JCS, Secretary of
Defense McNamara directed them to “consider all possible applications,
including use as an alternative to nuclear weapons. Prepare a plan for the