The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 31

construct its own facilities. 112 The Air Force, which presumably would
launch any major BW offensive, also lagged in reaching its goals; as late
as 1947, “No quantities of BW weapons were in stock.” 113
On 19 December 1949 the JCS had completed their “Long-Range Plans
for War with the USSR,” codenamed Dropshot. In its estimate of the rela-
tive combat strength of the USSR and NATO in biological warfare, the
JCS assessment of predictable US progress was cautiously optimistic
while remarking that it took “up to 18 months to attain quality produc-
tion” of BW. 114 Years of neglect could not be swiftly overcome. Despite
the challenge of the Korean War, despite new efforts devoted to BW plan-
ning and construction, reliable test data were still lacking, and opera-
tional planning was deficient. There seemed to be no hope of achieving
preparedness in the near future. 115
When would the US be realistically prepared for biological warfare?
That question had troubled successive secretaries of the army and defense
during the Truman administration. In 1952 Secretary of the Army Frank
Pace was pessimistic in his report to the secretary of defense: “If the signal
to 'retaliate' were given tomorrow or within the next year, the United
States could make little more than a token effort in CW and BW.” 116
By 1953 only two BW munitions were available: the M33 antiperson-
nel bomb and the M115 anticrop bomb. But the M33 suffered from “criti-
cal deficiencies.” And there were deeper problems revolving around tar-
geting and the impact of these weapons if they were used: “Particularly
curious was the fact that the Air Force had been unable to come up with
lucrative targets for biological munitions.” 117 This slow progress led to
skepticism regarding the value of BW. 118 There were persistent problems
with training, with management, with technical knowledge on how to
wed agent to munition, with coordination between the CmlC and the Air
Force. 119
Reports on preparedness differed significantly by agency. The CmlC
touted its achievements and trumpeted its imminent successes. In a re-
port delivered in July 1953 it listed its progress during fiscal year 1953:
standardization of two anticrop agents, bomb development, and ad-
vances in anticrop spray devices. It was most optimistic in predicting
forthcoming achievements. 120 The Joint Strategic Plans Committee
(JSPC) did not agree. Asked to evaluate CBW readiness in light of the
goals set by the Stevenson Report, it delivered a devastating verdict in