Analysis and Implications - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 365

and analyze the information they contain. Such an entity could provide a
forum for individual States Parties to approach one another in timely
fashion to seek clarification about ambiguities, uncertainties, and omis-
sions, thereby increasing transparency and, over time, building confi-
dence in compliance. For such a cooperative approach to be feasible,
however, States Parties would have to take submission of full and accu-
rate CBMs much more seriously than they have in the past.
Treaties and International Collaboration
What has been termed the “taboo” against the weaponization of poi-
son and disease is long-standing, reaching far down the generations and
across cultures. In a recent codification of the taboo, the 1925 Geneva
Protocol, the prohibition applies both to asphyxiating, poisonous, and
other gases and to use of bacteriological methods of warfare. This pro-
hibition recognizes chemical and biological agents as forming a broad
spectrum against which wide-ranging protective measures are required.
There was therefore a particular logic in the view taken by those who
pressed for a combined treaty to prohibit both CW and BW. Nevertheless,
the BWC was negotiated to ban only BW, although it included a commit-
ment to continue to work for a ban on CW, a commitment that came to
fruition 20 years later in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
The BWC prohibits under any circumstances the development, pro-
duction, stockpiling, or other acquisition or retention of “(1) Microbial or
other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of pro-
duction, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophy-
lactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” Successive Review Con-
ferences have extended the understandings of States Parties that “the
Convention unequivocally covers all microbial or other biological agents
or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as well as their com-
ponents, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes.” The CWC prohibits the development, production,
stockpiling, acquisition, retention, or use of CW, defined as including
“toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for pur-
poses not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and
quantities are consistent with such purposes.” Toxic chemicals are de-