Analysis and Implications - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 366

fined as “any chemical which through its chemical action on life pro-
cesses can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to
humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their
origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they
are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.” Munitions or other
devices designed to disseminate CW agents are also defined as chemical
weapons. 1
There is consequently today a comprehensive prohibition of both
chemical and biological weapons, with the midspectrum area including
toxins and bioregulators prohibited under both the BWC and the CWC. It
is against this background that recent events—notably the Russian use of
an anesthetic chemical during the Moscow theater siege in October 2002
and recent US efforts to develop “nonlethal” or “less than lethal” weap-
ons—cause so much concern. The central prohibitions in the BWC and
the CWC are enshrined in what is known as the “general-purpose crite-
rion,” which prohibits all biological agents unless “of types and in quanti-
ties” that are justified “for prophylactic, protective and other peaceful
purposes” and all chemical agents unless “of types and in quantities”
consistent with “purposes not prohibited under the Convention.” Un-
der the BWC, any program to develop “nonlethal” or “less than lethal”
weapons using materials that fall within the extended understanding
agreed by the States Parties quoted above is a violation of the BWC. The
situation with regard to the CWC is more complex, as the CWC, unlike
the BWC, includes “law enforcement including domestic riot control pur-
poses” as a purpose not prohibited, although it obliges each State Party
“not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.” Consequently, a
program to develop “nonlethal” or “less than lethal” weapons exclu-
sively for law enforcement, including riot-control purposes, is permitted
under the CWC so long as such weapons are not used for warfare and so
long as the chemicals concerned meet the CWC definition of a “riot con-
trol agent.” However, a program to develop such weapons or agents for
warfare is completely prohibited and in violation of the CWC.
International influences from 1945 to the present have clearly had a
major impact on the nature of national offensive biological warfare pro-
grams. In the early years, the thrust was primarily toward a BW program
that could be used in retaliation in kind should such weapons be used by
another state. The reservations to the Geneva Protocol made by all the