Analysis and Implications - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 363

trast, the difficulties that Western intelligence had in understanding the
Iraqi program suggests that smaller-scale but regionally significant pro-
grams may be much more difficult to assess with any great confidence.
Unless means can be found to increase the transparency of states' activi-
ties to counter bioterrorism and BW in both civil and military sectors, it
seems unlikely that the dilemmas of intelligence can be easily resolved.
Duality is also important in the context of the undertakings made by
States Parties under Article III of the BWC “not to transfer to any recipi-
ent whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, en-
courage, or induce any State, group of States or international organi-
zations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of this
Convention .” For this reason States Parties have increasingly required
that all exports of biological agents and toxins and associated equipment,
which might be misused to produce BW, be controlled and made subject
to prior approval by the exporting government. In order to ensure that no
novel agents or equipment are overlooked, States Parties have increas-
ingly included “catch-all” clauses in their export control legislation and
regulations, as well as including intangible technology within the scope
of such legislation and regulations.
Secrecy versus Transparency
Secrecy engenders suspicions about the real purpose of activities being
carried out by a state. Transparency contributes to building confidence
that such activities are indeed permitted peaceful activities. It was largely
for this reason that BWC States Parties agreed at the Second Review Con-
ference in 1986 that all parties should make annual declarations under
four confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a first step toward improv-
ing transparency. These CBMs were strengthened and extended at the
Third Review Conference in 1991. It is, however, unfortunate that not all
States Parties have made all the agreed annual declarations—only about
a dozen have done so—and of those parties that have made one or more
annual declarations, the information provided has been of uneven qual-
ity. Even so, it is important to recognize the contribution provided by
such official declarations, for they may provide the only official state-