Analysis and Implications - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 362

produce the agents by itself indicate the presence or absence of a prohib-
ited activity. As the language in the BWC makes it clear, the prohibition
applies to agents “ of types and in quantities that have no justification
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes .” Consequently, it
is the quantity and type of agents—and the scale of the equipment used
to produce the agent—that enter into the judgment as to whether a par-
ticular instance of possession of a biological agent is or is not possession of
a BW agent. Underlying intention remains the determining consider-
ation.
The information available from official sources about intelligence on
other countries' interests in BW programs is limited, as such information
is normally classified. It is evident that, given the dual-use nature of pro-
grams involving pathogenic microorganisms and toxins, it is difficult to
be certain whether a program on which information becomes available is
a national offensive program or merely an ongoing program for permit-
ted purposes—prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. In de-
veloping policy on the basis of intelligence, it needs to be recognized
throughout that intelligence analysts are expected to draw worst-case in-
terpretations from the available wisps of information. Furthermore, be-
cause intelligence analysts are making their assessments against a back-
ground of knowledge of their own national programs in this area, an
element of mirror-imaging is liable to enter the intelligence assessment.
Although intelligence analysts are generally aware of the strengths and
weaknesses of their assessments, it is by no means clear that the policy-
makers who make decisions based on those intelligence assessments are
equally aware. Similarly, policymakers may err on the side of caution so
that they cannot be accused of having failed to take steps to protect the
security of their country.
It is, of course, clear, in the case of the 1979 accident at Sverdlovsk, that
the US had information (not necessarily accurate) from both technical
and human sources that convinced it that the Soviet Union had contin-
ued its offensive program after signing the BWC. Although it would ap-
pear that the US did not have a complete understanding of the scale and
scope of the Soviet program until the defections at the end of the Cold
War, it is clear that such a large-scale program could not be established by
a major state in the future without substantial risk of detection. In con-