The Politics of Biological Disarmament - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 313

where immediate results are not required,” thus suggesting a clandestine
role for BW. Furthermore, it concluded that Russia was not “a suitable
target system for BW attacks.” In contrast, BW “could be a serious threat
to the UK civil population.” 38 These elements—UK vulnerability to BW,
an assessment of limited strategic and limited military tactical value of of-
fensive BW, and the unsuitability of Russia as a target of BW—continued
to be reasons motivating the UK BW control initiative throughout the
1960s.
The 1968 UK working paper came at a busy time for the ENDC. The
first priority for most delegations was a comprehensive test ban, and sec-
ond, a treaty prohibiting nuclear or other WMD on the seabed. With
these two draft treaties already on the agenda, some delegations expected
the UK to follow through on its 1968 paper and introduce a draft BW
treaty. However, London described the new Nixon administration as
wanting to avoid CW issues, and the administration regarded CBW as a
low priority: “the new people have so much on their plate already that
they are unlikely to have a CBW policy before the summer session.” 39
Indeed the policy review would not be completed until the fall of 1969.
Although there are indications that neither the US nor the USSR was par-
ticularly supportive of the UK initiative, it was not a high enough US pri-
ority for Washington to bother to restrain the UK.
The UK argument for a prompt ban on the use and possession of BW
contained four elements: (1) BW “are regarded with general abhorrence,
possibly more so than any other means of waging war”; (2) “it seems un-
likely that development or use of biological weapons is, at the moment,
regarded by any state as essential to its security”; (3) new technological
developments could lead to BW becoming an integral part of some states'
armaments; and (4) it would be easier to achieve a ban before such arma-
ment took place than after. 40 The statement that development or use of
BW was not regarded by any state as essential to its security was subse-
quently challenged by MOD personnel, who argued that the US did re-
gard possession of BW—in order to retaliate in kind if necessary—as es-
sential to its deterrent policy. 41
On the key question of why to separate chemical and biological weap-
ons the arguments involved mainly political pragmatism. Because biolog-
ical methods were at an earlier stage of development, prohibiting BW
should be easier. Because conditions were favorable, the paper argued,
states might “simply throw away the chance of getting an effective and