The Politics of Biological Disarmament - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 312

The 1968 UK Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare
The UK delegation to the ENDC tabled a working paper on microbiologi-
cal warfare on 6 August 1968 that described the principal elements of a
new convention:
• A common understanding that any use of microbiological warfare and in
any circumstances was contrary to international law and a crime against
humanity and therefore a prohibition of use
• A ban on the production of agents for hostile purposes while recognizing
the necessity of production of agents for peaceful purposes
• A ban on the production of ancillary equipment
• An obligation to destroy stocks of agents or equipment
• A ban on research aimed at production of prohibited agents and equip-
ment
• Provisions for access by authorities to “all research which might give rise
to allegations” of noncompliance
• Openness of relevant research to international investigation and public
scrutiny
Regarding verification measures the working paper in tentative language
recommended a “competent body of experts, established under the aus-
pices of the United Nations,” to investigate allegations of breaches of the
convention and a commitment by parties to cooperate with any investi-
gation. Finally, the working paper also contained tentatively phrased rec-
ommendations on entry into force and actions to counter the use or
threatened use of BW.
The momentum behind the UK initiative can be said to have its roots in
a series of papers from the Defence Research Policy Committee of the
MOD in 1961. 37 These papers included separate operational assessments
of CW and BW and recommendations for UK policy. In addition to ubiq-
uitous recommendations for further study, a summary paper of the as-
sessments prepared for the Chiefs of Staff concluded that there was no
need for the UK to have either a CW or BW strategic offensive capability,
because nuclear weapons “are far more effective and economical for the
attack of civil populations.” Nevertheless the summary acknowledged
that such weapons might have some strategic use, in a sense keeping op-
tions open. Similarly, the paper ruled out any tactical potential of BW in
military situations but allowed that “there might be uses in circumstances