Allegations of Biological Weapons Use - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 282

voked, 126 yet which is centrally important to a treaty that lacks an effec-
tive compliance regime.
Article V could also be used for retrospective resolution of allegations.
In the case of the Korean War allegations, there are only a few specific
outbreaks in which the allegations matched US capabilities for small-
scale, covert attack, 127 and scientific study of retained autopsy and other
material could definitively prove or disprove the allegations. Indeed, it
appears that this has already been done for one specific instance—a clus-
ter of inhalational anthrax cases—in which the agent appears to have
been indigenous, not the one used in the US BW program. Collaboration
between China and the US, under the aegis of Article V, could finally lay
to rest any remaining suspicions. Similar collaboration between Cuba and
the US has the potential to yield decisive results. However, given the long
and bitter relations between these two countries, it may be unreasonable
to hope for such collaboration in the near future.
Despite the lack of credible evidence, there are lingering suspicions
over the yellow rain allegations, and it is unlikely that any retrospective
scientific study could resolve them. It would be of great benefit to the in-
ternational community if Russia, Vietnam, and Laos (all parties to the
BWC) would provide independent scholars with archival access adequate
to clarify the issue.
Even in the absence of formal international arrangements, indepen-
dent collaboration among scientists can be quite productive. This fact was
demonstrated dramatically in the Sverdlovsk case, in which definitive
retrospective resolution of the allegations was achieved by a collabora-
tion of independent Western and Russian experts. Of course, this re-
quired governmental consent and access, but did not require the more
substantial political and diplomatic commitment of a formal international
or bilateral effort. Such efforts could be productively encouraged by non-
governmental organizations, scientific societies, and individual scientists.
It is clear that the allegations we have considered here were stimulated
in part by the secrecy that surrounds military biology programs. When
accused countries had offensive BW programs, secrecy was understand-
able, but since 1975 offensive BW programs have been illegal for States
Parties to the BWC. For any country with a defensive program only, se-
crecy is less obviously necessary. We believe that national and interna-
tional security would be enhanced by a reduction of secrecy to the mini-