Allegations of Biological Weapons Use - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 281

human action. In these two instances, the accusing countries made a seri-
ous attempt to meet their responsibilities, but failed because of serious
problems with the provenance of evidence, with investigator bias, and
with ambiguities about what might be natural. These were foreseeable
problems, and could have been anticipated and coped with.
Clearly, extraordinary care should be taken when alleging BW use, as
evidence sufficient to convince the predisposed may be routinely avail-
able to the (consciously or unconsciously) selective data gatherer. Scru-
pulous attention to best scientific practice and to forensic standards in the
gathering and testing of evidence is necessary to sustain serious charges.
It is one thing to collect evidence that confirms prior convictions, but
quite another to collect evidence sufficient to convince skeptics.
Mechanisms of investigation of disease outbreaks that will allow a ro-
bust determination of the origin of suspicious outbreaks should be an
important priority for the international community, as the primary stake-
holder in resolving allegations. Whether such mechanisms are estab-
lished via binding international agreements or through less formal ar-
rangements matters less than their effectiveness. The technical capacity
to investigate outbreaks so as to clarify their origin has existed for a num-
ber of years now, 123 so serious attention to a workable mechanism for ap-
plying this capability should be productive.
One possibility would be to use the existing authority of the secretary
general of the UN to assemble lists of experts and competent laboratories
and to mount investigations of allegations of use of CW or BW. 124 Unfor-
tunately, the few attempts to invoke this authorization have been fail-
ures, as UN teams have been denied necessary access. 125 To be effective,
this mechanism would need serious political commitment by the UN
community to insist on rights of access of investigation teams sponsored
by the secretary general. Alternatively, the Security Council could estab-
lish a permanent body with responsibility for preventing BW develop-
ment complementary to the International Atomic Energy Agency and
the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons.
For concerned states that are parties to the BWC, it would be possible
to use Article V of the Convention (see the appendix) as a vehicle for co-
operative efforts to resolve allegations. Not only would Article V provide
a context for international consultations, but using it would reinvigo-
rate this consultative provision of the BWC which has been so rarely in-