The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 10

his final report to Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, summarizing the
World War II biological warfare program. In his report Merck concluded
that the program was essential to national security. 3 Five months later the
Military Intelligence Division of the US Army echoed Merck's opinion. 4
Twenty-four years later, in a complete reversal, on 25 November 1969,
the US unilaterally renounced its offensive biological warfare program.
President Nixon was openly contemptuous of germ warfare, dismissing it
as useless. 5 After the president had declared that the US would also re-
nounce toxins, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was asked by
a reporter whether such unilateral renunciation would weaken deter-
rence. He replied: “We also believe that we have other weapons of retali-
ation, including chemical and nuclear weapons, which we could use if
toxins were used against us.” 6
In 1972 the US joined other major powers in signing the subsequently
negotiated Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In 1975 the US rati-
fied both the Geneva Protocol and the BWC. A sea change had taken
place in American policy.
American post-World War II BW policy thus falls into two phases:
an offensive one from 1945 to 1969, and a defensive one from 1969
to the present. This chapter analyzes both phases, addressing questions
of policy, intelligence, organization, facilities, research and development
(R&D), testing, envisioned use, and preparedness.
Offensive Phase: 1945-1969
Policy
Policy is not an integrated whole, free from internal contradictions. It falls
into four categories: legal, declaratory, agreed, and implemented. Legal
policy consists of treaties and laws limiting what a government can do.
Declaratory policy consists of public declarations on the course a nation
chooses to pursue—for example, “no first use” of CBW. Agreed policy is
the result of discussions within a government. The subsequent agree-
ment is often kept secret, leaving the government free either to ignore or
to forget it. Finally, there is implemented policy: how a nation actually
behaves. For example, although the US made some exceptions to the
Geneva Protocol, it adhered to the Protocol's “no first use” prohibition