The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 11

with regard to lethal CBW. Implemented policy is determined by capabil-
ity and circumstance: what a government can do and what it wants to do.
Ultimately, policy is action.
Despite Merck's warning about the dangers of ignoring the potential of
BW, the development of these weapons was largely neglected in the late
1940s. But the question remained: How important would BW prove in
any future war? In 1947 the acting Army chief of staff posed that ques-
tion in evaluating a series of future developments in weapon systems:
“the probability of biological warfare being extremely effective cannot be
ruled out...itmayhold a considerable future potential.” 7
An obstacle to any offensive BW program lay in the moral qualms
about continuing to pursue a program that had all the markings of black
science. How would scientists reconcile such an enterprise with their
moral convictions? But many scientists, even those who detested war,
had no problem. Theodore Rosebury, a distinguished biologist, resolved
his moral dilemma by invoking social responsibility and patriotism. 8
During this period advocates of BW preparedness defined what they
saw as its advantages, establishing a theoretical base for its development.
The case for BW was often argued simultaneously with the case for
chemical and radiological warfare. Five arguments shaped the case. First,
the USSR, with its large conventional forces, could overrun Europe and
a large part of the Near and Middle East within six months. Second,
toxic weapons could be used to counter Soviet conventional military su-
periority. Third, these weapon systems would not destroy property, and
thereby freed the victor from the task of urban reconstruction. Fourth,
they would be useful in obtaining surprise over the enemy. Fifth, they
could have considerable psychological impact. 9
Among these systems, BW were seen as superior. 10 They would
shorten a war by threatening a “significant proportion of a populace,”
thereby leading to a negotiated settlement. 11 However, before there could
be any consideration of policy, the value of BW as a military option had to
be examined.
On 16 March 1948 Secretary of Defense James Forrestal informed
President Truman that the Joint Research and Development Board rec-
ommended a “review of national policy on biological warfare.” Priority
would go to its military value. Once this estimate was completed, broad
policy questions would “be in order.” 12