Historical Context and Overview - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 7

and synthetic chemical analogs of all of these. Many of these midspec-
trum agents, particularly the bioregulators and their analogs, offer poten-
tial as effective incapacitating weapons and behavior control agents. As
Chapter 12 makes clear, there has been continuing military interest in
midspectrum incapacitants.
The last half of the twentieth century saw not only BW development
but also active efforts to ban BW. The Geneva Protocol had already
banned their use in war, but it did nothing to prevent the development of
BW and the accumulation of major stockpiles held for retaliation and
for deterrent value. In the late 1960s momentum built to achieve a ro-
bust ban that would encompass development and possession, to prevent
countries from entering hostilities equipped with large stockpiles of BW,
lest circumstances tempt them to use these prohibited materials. The Bio-
logical Weapons Convention was the result of these efforts. It bans the
development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of both biological and
toxin agents not intended for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful
purposes. It also bans munitions to disseminate biological agents for hos-
tile purposes. The BWC conceives agents broadly, encompassing anti-
human, anticrop, and antianimal infectious agents, toxins, and mid-
spectrum agents. Some consider that the BWC also extends to biological
agents intended for antimateriel purposes, a belief that is reflected in, for
example, US legislation implementing the BWC. 2
The BWC is clear, and it is robust enough to encompass new agents
that biotechnology is making possible. However, it has very weak provi-
sions for resolving suspicions of noncompliance, and considerable diplo-
matic effort has been devoted to developing a new international agree-
ment that would add an inspection regime to the BWC prohibitions. So
far these efforts have proved unsuccessful, and it is unclear if the politi-
cal climate will be conducive to resumption anytime in the near future.
Chapters 15 and 16 cover the political and legal perspectives on the de-
velopment of the biological disarmament regime.
Central Issues
In considering BW development programs since 1945, we address three
central issues: (1) Why have states continued or begun programs for ac-
quiring BW? (2) Why have states terminated BW programs? and (3) How