The South African Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 203

1994, prepared by Surgeon General D. P. Knobel. Under a subheading
“Enquiry by Ambassadors of the USA and UK” it states:
On 11 April 94 the SP [State President] and the Minister of Defence
were advised by the Ambassadors of the USA and the UK of their gov-
ernment's position with regard to the above [chemical and biological
warfare] programme as well as the CBM [confidence-building measure]
declaration submitted by the RSA [Republic of South Africa] in 1993.
They stated that they were fully aware of the contents and extent of
the SADF CBW programme and that they had certain reservations about
the RSA's CBM declaration as well as the implications for non-prolifera-
tion. 55
A second meeting took place on 22 April 1994 between the US and UK
ambassadors and De Klerk. At this meeting, held a week before South Af-
rica's first democratic elections, De Klerk argued that a defensive program
had been justified and that the data resulting from the program were a
national asset that would not be destroyed. 56
In January 1995, in a third démarche brought by the governments of
the US and the UK, Basson's travels to Libya and elsewhere remained an
issue. 57 The US and UK clearly knew enough about the South African
CBW program to judge that the CBM submitted by South Africa was in-
accurate: Why else would they have been concerned about Basson's con-
tact with Libya? But the larger question is why the US and UK chose to
do and say nothing to prevent the South African CBW program from
continuing during the 1980s and early 1990s. The answer probably lies in
US policy toward South Africa during the Cold War.
US policy toward South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s was openly
condemnatory but privately supportive. US government statements con-
demned apartheid, but the administration was acutely aware both of
South Africa's strategic importance and of its significance as one of the
two most important producers of platinum-group metals—together with
Russia it accounts for some 90 percent of the world's supply. In a 1985 re-
search paper, the CIA noted the risk of a diminished supply should the US
be included in a trade embargo against South Africa. 58
South Africa's significance as a key mineral supplier was just one factor
influencing US policy. During the 1970s US policy toward South Africa to
end apartheid vacillated according to the particular US administration.