The Soviet Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 144

to multiple types of antibiotics. It also carried out work on modifying the
antigenic structures of bacteria and viruses to evade the body's immune
system. The System attempted to obtain strains that were resistant to
multiple types of antibiotic treatment and did not lose their virulence in
the process. Domaradsky promoted the “binary concept,” in which two
or more strains were employed simultaneously. One strain of F. tularensis,
for example, would be developed primarily for its antibiotic resistance,
while another strain would be developed primarily for the retention of its
virulence. The concept was reportedly used as a basis for developing a
plague strain resistant to approximately 10 antibiotics. 61 It is not clear
whether this concept was adopted as MOD policy or was instead applied
in a more ad hoc manner by low- or mid-level personnel, such as scien-
tific research staff.
At least two projects to genetically engineer variola virus have been re-
ported, one by combining it with VEE virus, and one by combining it with
Ebola virus. There is disagreement among intelligence analysts and oth-
ers about whether such work was actually carried out, as well as about its
technical feasibility. 62
In 1988 Nikolai Ustinov, a Vector employee, accidentally injected him-
self with Marburg virus and died approximately three weeks later. His
blood was used to grow a strain of the virus called Variant U that was sub-
sequently weaponized. 63 It also appears that field tests of variola virus on
Vozrozdeniye Island resulted in at least three civilian smallpox deaths in
Aralsk in 1971. 64
Evaluations and Understanding of the Program
Intelligence
The sources of information available to outside intelligence organizations
on the Soviet BW program included U-2 airplane overflights of Soviet
territory, 65 interviews with defectors and other individuals with firsthand
contact with the Soviets, World War II German assessments, reviews of
the scientific published literature, and statements on military doctrine.
The US understanding of Soviet BW following World War II and through
the 1960s appears to have been largely speculative and uncertain (see
Chapter 2). US assessments were based partly on the requirements devel-