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oped for the US BW program and on perceived US vulnerabilities. The US
was also concerned about possible BW sabotage operations on its terri-
tory. In addition, the US and, to a lesser extent, other countries have sys-
tematically collected information by, among other things, talking with in-
dividuals formerly associated with the Soviet BW program.
There appears to have been no positive proof until the 1970s that
the Soviets had an offensive BW program. The 1979 anthrax deaths in
Sverdlovsk strongly suggested an offensive Soviet program. Pasechnik's
defection was perhaps the most significant event, convincing skeptics in
the US and the UK. The information he provided showed that the Soviet
offensive BW program was continuing on a large scale, in contravention
of the BWC. He also described work meant to make BW agents resistant
to environmental stresses and medical treatment. For example, he re-
portedly described a powdered form of antibiotic-resistant
Yersinia pestis
strain produced for filling warheads. He maintained that the USSR had a
20-ton stockpile of
Yersinia pestis
and was periodically replenishing it. He
also confirmed that Vozrozdeniye Island had been used for large-scale
field testing of BW agents.
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A 1965 CIA study concluded that there was “no firm evidence of an of-
fensive Soviet BW program.” At the time, however, a presumption ex-
isted within US intelligence that the Soviets had such a program. This
presumption was based partly on the fact that the USSR was undertaking
defensive measures and partly on a belief that it was logical for the USSR
to have an offensive program in view of a range of factors, including Ja-
pan's possession of an offensive BW program during World War II and the
widely known US commitment to BW. US intelligence was forced to rely
on indirect methods to try to determine whether the Soviet Union had an
offensive BW program. The CIA study noted: “Analysts have used specu-
lation, analogy, and parallels with other nations' BW research, develop-
ment, and practice in recent times and in the historical past. They have
analyzed Soviet, Satellite, and Chinese propaganda charges of US germ
warfare for clues as to the Communists' sophistication and familiarity
with BW hardware and agents.” Indirect methods included a literature
review of “military-related activity in the field of biology and medicine,
all technical publications which appeared to be censored by security con-
siderations, and all biomedical studies which did not jibe with Soviet pub-
lic health requirements as we know them.”
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