The French Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 129

such a situation the technical organizations have experienced great dif-
ficulty arriving at a precise definition of the goals to be attained.” 64 The
DMA therefore proposed the creation, within its own structure, of an or-
ganization that would govern the entire BW program, in order to bring
together all biological activity, establish liaison with the Armed Forces
Staff, and allow the programs to be defined. At the same time, the Conseil
de Défense agreed on 25 June 1965 that “a person shall be designated by
the minister of the armed forces to assume responsibility for activities re-
lating to biological and bacteriological weapons and protection against
their effects. This person will coordinate the tasks presently distributed
among the Armed Forces Staff, the Service de Santé des Armées, the
Services des Poudres, the Direction des Recherches et Moyens d'Essais,
and other collaborators.” 65 The DMA's proposals were finally ratified by
General Ailleret on 20 July 1967, 66 centralizing under the Direction Tech-
nique des Armements Terrestres responsibility for research and opera-
tions in biological and chemical spheres that had previously been de-
volved to the Services des Poudres and the SBVA. A newly formed
Nuclear Biological Chemical Joint Armed Forces Committee (Comité
Interarmées NBC, or CINBC) would in turn comprise two working
groups: the first, dealing with “biological and chemical armament and
retaliation,” would be responsible for drafting a doctrine for utilization,
proposing a concept of use that would determine the equipment re-
quired, and, finally, determining the parameters for the programs of re-
search, study, and execution; the second, the Défense NBC, would have
responsibility for all defensive aspects. The CINBC met for the first time in
January 1968.
Although the SGTEB continued its work during this period, there was
widespread uncertainty about the future of the program, which was left
to fend for itself in the absence of reliable direction. At a meeting of the
biology subgroup on 20 December 1966, the chairman remarked that
“the only directives received on this subject for the last three years are
those that came from the former Commission Interarmées des Etudes et
Expérimentations Chimiques et Biologiques” and that the only directives
addressed to the working group were those interpreting the decisions of
the Conseil de Défense. He expressed a desire for further clarification,
particularly with regard to actions altering the instructions received pre-
viously. 67 Although no clear evidence of formal notification by the min-
ister of defense or Conseil de Défense survives in the archives of the