The French Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 128

1964-1972: Death Throes
In 1964 France's BW program entered a period of incoherence exacer-
bated by chronic organizational instability. The switch in policy brought
about periods of administrative and hierarchical confusion that left re-
search organizations to their own devices, without clear instructions as to
where their efforts should be directed. This situation reflected the total
lack of concern among political and military decisionmakers regarding
the status of BW, which from then occupied a distant third place behind
chemical and nuclear armaments. The policy change also signaled a con-
siderable shrinkage in the budget allocated to BW. From the mid-1960s
on, France gradually abandoned the offensive element of the program
and retained only activities that were strictly defensive. The shift away
from offensive measures was made official in 1972 following the signing
of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), although France did not
formally ratify the treaty until 1984 because it made no provision for a
system of verification.
In June 1964, the dissolution of the CIAS 60 brought with it the demise
of the CIEECB and another administrative reorganization of the BW pro-
gram. However, the activities of the SGTEB remained unaffected; having
been given a new lease on life in January 1965, 61 thereafter it operated
under the aegis of the DMA. The latter determined the parameters of re-
search and study in liaison with the Special Weapons Section of the Army
General Staff. The DMA thus assumed the role of the ex-CIAS. 62 The mis-
sions of the working group remained, as before, “to facilitate the ex-
change of information between different organizations participating at
different levels and within various hierarchies in the execution of these
programs in order to coordinate execution, to formulate proposals that
may alter the direction of these programs, or to improve the conditions of
their execution.” 63
Subsequently the Délégation Générale à l'Armement, which became de
facto the authority over the military weapons program, began considering
future organization in the light of the new objectives assigned to the pro-
gram. Its considerations took the form of a memo drafted during 1965,
addressed to Pierre Messmer, minister of the armed forces, and titled “Or-
ganization of Biological and Chemical Operations.” The memo noted that
“the biological program has never in recent years been granted sufficient
priority for it to be regarded with interest by the Armed Forces Staff. In