Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
Canada will in no instance initiate nuclear, biological or chemical war-
fare; b) Canadian Armed Forces may be committed to participate in a war
in which the use of N, B or C is initiated by an enemy; c) The Canadian
Armed Forces will develop the knowledge and the capacity to ensure that
protective measures are adequate, and that a capability for retaliation in
kind could be quickly instituted if so directed.”
44
Canadian BW policies were also affected by its active role in NATO,
particularly during the 1960s. The Cuban Missile Crisis had forced NATO
to consider seriously the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
civil defense capabilities of its members through a myriad of standing
committees and working groups. In the case of nuclear and chemical
weapons, efforts had been under way since the early 1950s to devise de-
fensive and survival tactics. In April 1962 biological warfare was added to
the list as part of a comprehensive survey carried out by the NATO Mili-
tary Committee on Civil Defense Preparedness. In its final report the
committee lamented “the lack of progress in Allied Command Europe in
acquiring a CB defensive and retaliatory capability . . . due in part, to the
sensitive political nature of this type of warfare.”
45
This was deemed a se-
rious military deficiency because of growing evidence that the USSR had
dramatically increased its chemical and biological arsenal of nerve gases,
incapacitating agents, and the means “for spreading biological warfare
agents over large areas, thus constituting a new major weapons threat.”
46
The specific threat of biological warfare was discussed in an April 1965
report of NATO's Standing Group on Science and Technology: “The Sovi-
ets appreciate the potentialities of biological warfare and have given con-
sideration to its use...[but] There is no evidence to indicate a tactical of-
fensive biological or radiological warfare capability in the Soviet armed
forces.” The following year, however, this relatively optimistic assessment
was revised on the basis of more accurate intelligence. Now the Soviet bi-
ological warfare threat was regarded as real and imminent: “Advances in
biological warfare offensive programs will depend upon Soviet intentions
. . . there is no doubt the Soviets have the necessary background and ex-
perience to develop a complete array of BW munitions systems for a vari-
ety of strategic and tactical uses...Theagents for use could already
be standardized individually or in combination with other biological or
chemical agents.”
47
Given this ominous prognosis, NATO's Military Committee decided to
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