Biology Reference
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Nuclear War, CBW, and NATO, 1962-1968
Canada's close association with US military policies was brought into
clear focus during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. 41 In both
countries there was, for example, renewed interest in civil defense. Ot-
tawa's worst-case scenario was based on the assumption that if 16 Cana-
dian cities were attacked with nuclear weapons, the combined effects of
blast, thermal energy, immediate radiation, fallout residual radiation, and
subsequent epidemics would result in approximately 4.5 million deaths,
or 25 percent of the Canadian population. The related threat of BW was
also part of the Canadian civil defense agenda, as outlined by one 1963
report:
The form of overt biological warfare most likely to be used against us in
the event of war, would be the creation of aerosol clouds of critically
sized particles containing aggregates of pathogenic agents. Urban areas
and important military targets might be subjected to this form of attack.
Biological warfare agents could be conceivably used by subversive meth-
ods in a variety of fashions and a saboteur might introduce pathogenic
agents into the air of localized but strategically important communities. 42
Although the nuclear Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 marked some
progress in controlling one WMD, the BW threat was not necessarily di-
minished. On the contrary, the nuclear stalemate appeared to increase
the possibility that the Warsaw Pact might launch a series of limited wars,
using CBW. If such a situation materialized, the crucial question was
whether the US or its allies should retaliate in kind or immediately resort
to nuclear weapons. In this debate over the advantages of a flexible re-
sponse, one group of military planners called for the deployment of bio-
logical and chemical incapacitants both for military reasons and because
“public feeling against the use of BW and CW would be largely elimi-
nated.” 43
Between 1963 and 1969 Canada redefined its position on all WMD,
under the watchful eye of the US. Ottawa's belated decision to accept tac-
tical nuclear weapons, as part of its NATO and NORAD obligations, has
been the focus of many scholarly studies. Less well known was the May
1963 secret policy statement on CBW issued by the Canadian Chiefs
of the General Staff, which established three operational principles: “a)
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