Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
At the same time, Greenpeace International advocated a set of principles, called
the 'Bhopal Principles on Corporate Accountability'. Although this proposal was for the
global adoption of a set of voluntary principles to hold corporations accountable, the
clear intention was to then ratchet up the principles to the status of a legally binding
treaty. The Bhopal Principles included measures to ensure that corporations follow key
principles of the Rio Declaration, including those on liability for damages, avoidance of
double standards in the global operations of TNCs, and application of the precautionary
principle and the polluter pays principle (Greenpeace International, 2002).
The idea of a corporate accountability treaty did not receive a warm welcome from
industry groups at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (see Clapp, 2005).
Although early drafts of the Plan of Implementation included a commitment to 'launch
negotiations for a multilateral agreement on corporate accountability' (cited in Graymore
and Bunn, 2002, p. 1), this commitment was watered down in the
nal version. NGOs pro-
moting the idea of a treaty blame the removal of this commitment on the intense lobby-
ing by industry at the summit (CEO, 2001). The Plan does encourage active promotion of
both corporate responsibility and accountability, however, and mentions the importance
of intergovernmental agreements and measures, along with other mechanisms. Some see
this as leaving the door open for future discussions on a corporate accountability treaty
(Morgera, 2004, p. 219). Although discussions on a legally binding corporate account-
ability treaty have not been launched as yet, it is important to assess the pros and cons of
such an approach.
There are some clear advantages to a legally binding international corporate account-
ability treaty over the myriad of disparate voluntary e
fi
orts for corporate greening cur-
rently available, each of which would contribute to the enhancement of the actual
environmental performance of global
ff
rms. Having a single, legally binding instrument
would remedy the limited reach of domestic regulations in the international sphere. With
current legal systems based on domestic regulations, it is often di
fi
cult, if not impossible,
for communities in developing countries to launch a formal complaint and seek redress
for environmental damages caused by foreign corporations (Macklem, 2005). A single
treaty would also help to eliminate overlap and duplication of e
orts. A common set of
foundational principles would be established by a global instrument, providing a regula-
tory '
ff
oor' (Waddock, 2004), avoiding the problem we have at present where some initia-
tives have more stringent regulations than others. Consolidation of e
fl
orts into one treaty
with common principles would also ensure that corporations could not pick and choose
which standards to follow, as they currently do. Monitoring and enforcement would also
be stronger than the current situation. Because the treaty would be signed by states, which
would oblige them to implement and enforce the treaty, there would be stronger state
incentive to ensure compliance. At present, because the current voluntary measures are
not state mandated, states have employed a very hands-o
ff
attitude toward them. Civil
society does play a role in some monitoring and enforcement in some of the current mech-
anisms, but this role could be strengthened and reinforced with an internationally legally
binding treaty. Further, the threat of legal liability for infractions, which many see as
central to such a treaty, would be a strong motivator of industry to green practices.
Although there are some clear advantages to pursuing a single legally binding treaty at
the global level to ensure corporate accountability, there are also reasons why pursuit of
such a strategy may be extremely di
ff
cult in practice at the present time. First, as was made
