Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
clear at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, industry is not in favor
of the idea, which it sees as a 'one size
ts all' approach. Industry has argued that the
current myriad of voluntary and sector-speci
fi
fi
c approaches is more appropriate and
viable because they provide
exibility to industry to adopt measures that best suit their
needs (Moody Stuart, 2002). Although such a treaty would be negotiated and imple-
mented among governments, corporate actors do exert power and in
fl
uence over such
exercises, in a variety of ways (Fuchs, 2005). For this reason, as long as industry is
opposed to the idea of such a treaty, the likelihood that negotiations will be launched to
put it into place is slim.
In addition to strong industry opposition to the idea, there is also currently a lack of
political will among states to pursue this option. Emerging economies that are increas-
ingly host to TNCs, such as China, as well as a number of OECD countries that are the
source of much of the world's FDI, would probably be strong opponents of a global
treaty on TNC activity that is so general in scope and that may undermine or contradict
the bilateral investment treaties currently being negotiated between states. Even if talks
were launched, enormous e
fl
ort might go into negotiating such a treaty, but it could be
reduced to the least common denominator and would lose its e
ff
ectiveness if weakened.
How to prove environmental damage and assign liability, assign a value to damages and
enforce payments, would all be highly contentious issues. Further, pursuing a corporate
accountability treaty could also have legal rami
ff
cations that proponents might not want
to encourage, such as enhancing the legal personality of TNCs in the global arena
(Macklem, 2005, p. 289).
fi
Conclusion
The current wide-ranging suite of voluntary mechanisms that promote corporate green-
ing at the global level is far from perfect. There are at present many di
erent, disparate
and overlapping voluntary mechanisms for corporate greening. This leads to a crowded
corporate greening landscape, confusion about the di
ff
erences between the various mea-
sures, and a lack of a clear overarching articulation of what is necessary for greening
global investment. Moreover, while the present instruments outlined in the
ff
rst part of
this chapter may address certain sorts of environment problems, they ignore others and
lack real enforcement mechanisms and performance criteria. And with such a diverse
set of arrangements on the menu, corporations have been able to pick and choose what
they do in terms of CSR environmental measures. Strong critiques have been made of
the available instruments, and it is now largely understood that most of these mecha-
nisms are weak overall in terms of eliciting major change in corporate practice. These
problems have translated into patchy and uneven progress in terms of actual corporate
greening.
At the same time, the political climate at the moment does not seem right for the pursuit
of a corporate accountability treaty. Although a single legally binding instrument for cor-
porate accountability could embody key sustainability principles across a number of
industries, be applied globally, and have a built-in strength to spur corporate change by
holding corporations legally liable, there are a number of obstacles to seeing such a treaty
adopted in the near future.
While this might appear to present a dilemma for those wishing to promote corporate
accountability on the environmental front, recent developments within the existing
fi
