Chemistry Reference
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properties. But others (like being an acid), are defined functionally, and they will
not be reducible to any particular physical properties. This depicts an image of
chemistry as a “mixed” science - a science that is close enough to physics so that
some of the properties it talks about are microphysical properties, but also a science
that begins to emancipate itself from the base, and deals with genuinely new
properties. The “mixed” character of chemistry qualifies the thesis that chemistry
is ontologically autonomous from physics, and perhaps it weakens it to some extent.
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the mixed character of chemistry
makes the ontology of this discipline as a whole a sub-domain of the ontology of
physics. Since the sui generis properties and regularities that chemistry talks about
are sufficiently numerous and pervasive, the ontological autonomy of chemistry can
be preserved.
This image of chemistry as a “mixed science” offers only a partial support to the
classical layer cake model of science that has been assumed by many reductionists,
anti-reductionists and emergentists alike. The chemical properties and regularities
are always susceptible of disruptions “from below”. In other words, chemical
properties and regularities can always be affected by physical or microphysical
factors. A clear example is the influence of temperature on chemical reactions, but
numerous other examples could be found. Physical factors such as electromagnetic
fields, pressure, even gravity may interfere with chemical properties and laws, no
matter how sui generis these are. Thus, although chemistry has its own ontology
which is distinct from that of physics, is not “insulated” from physics. To express
this in the terms of the layer cake metaphor, chemistry is not a perfectly distinct
layer that lays flat on top of the physical layer. Instead of the layer cake model,
perhaps a better model could be suggested, one which captures more accurately the
relationships between the various sciences. For the lack of a better metaphor, this
could be called the “Easter bread” model. In the “Easter bread” model, the sciences
are not arranged neatly in distinct layers, with physics at the base and then followed
by chemistry, biology, psychology, etc.; rather, they interweave and penetrate each
other globally, although locally they typically retain their distinctness.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper I attempted to outline a novel approach to emergence in chemistry.
The motivation for this was twofold: on the one hand, emergence is a way to secure
the ontological autonomy of chemistry from physics; on the other, the most
prominent approaches to ontological emergence in chemistry have been met with
scepticism. The account I proposed differs from the most prominent existing
accounts in several ways. What is emergent on my account is not entities, but
properties, laws and explanations. Although the account I
m proposing may be new
to chemistry, it is not new to philosophy (though the phrase “functional emergence”
as I used it here may be). Functional properties which are multiply realizable have
long been associated with a philosophical position known as nonreductive
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