Chemistry Reference
In-Depth Information
Functional emergence need not be committed to the emergence of entities, or to
their ability to exert downward causation; it is committed solely to the emergence of
properties, laws, and explanations. As a result, there need not be any conflict with
the completeness of physics; functional emergence and the completeness of physics
can peacefully coexist.
4.4 Two Objections
There are several problems with the view that I
m sketching, but I will only discuss
two of them. First, one may object to calling the account of emergence I
'
m
proposing
ontological
. Since on this account entities do not count as emergent,
why claim that functional emergence is a kind of ontological emergence? After all,
if all chemical entities are composed of nothing else except microphysical entities,
doesn
'
t this mean that the ontology of chemistry reduces to, or is a subset of, the
ontology of physics?
The problem with the argument above is that it construes ontology in a restricted
way, as referring exclusively to entities (i.e., individuals). Ontology is concerned
not only with entities, but also with properties, laws, and on some accounts,
explanations. If one distinguishes between a property and its instances, as one
should, the fact that every instance of a chemical property is composed of nothing
else except instances of microphysical properties does not mean that all chemical
properties are in fact microphysical properties in disguise.
12
Similarly, it would be a
mistake to think that if all events are governed by physical laws, then all laws must
be physical. Although the entities that chemistry talks about may be composed of
nothing else except microphysical entities, this leaves open the possibility of sui
generis chemical
properties
and
laws
. But if that is the case, there is a sense in
which one can still talk about the ontological autonomy of chemistry. This result
contrasts with the view advocated by McIntyre, who argued that the ontological
interpretation of the concept of emergence should nearly always be eschewed in
favour of an epistemological interpretation (McIntyre
2007
).
It must be admitted, however, that this ontological autonomy is not radical: if the
entities that microphysics talks about were to vanish, there would be nothing left;
consequently, there would be no chemical properties, no laws relating these prop-
erties, and no explanations employing those laws and properties; although the
ontology of chemistry is autonomous from the ontology of physics, it relies upon it.
The second problem is that not all chemical properties are defined functionally.
What does this situation tell us with respect to the nature of chemistry as a science,
and its autonomy from physics? In my view, this situation reflects the status of
chemistry as “the first” of the special sciences. Some chemical properties (like the
property of being an alcohol) can be reductively identified with microphysical
'
12
For the distinction between a property and its instances see Swoyer and Orilia (
2011
).
