Chemistry Reference
In-Depth Information
in a manner that sometimes proves to be unacceptable from the viewpoint of the
theory to which they originally belong. In this way, intertheoretic links transform
the reducing theory with assumptions external to and frequently incompatible with
that theory itself. Hettema acknowledges that these links supply a notion of
reduction so liberal that it could even be made compatible with non-reductionist
positions. But once the concept of reduction has been relaxed in such a way, we are
entitled to ask why the relationship between chemistry and physics is still called
'
.
The answer to this question relies on the defense of the unity of science, which is
viewed as a “corollary” of the notion of reduction (Hettema
2012
, p. 11): “
reduction
originated as a primary glue in the unity of science. Hence reduction has a strongly
programmatic aspect
,
which has consequences not only for the individual status of
theories
,
but also for how theories hang together
” (Hettema
2012
, p. 42).
According to the author, the rejection of the reduction of chemistry to physics
leads to “[t]
he lazy conclusion that physics and chemistry occupy different
reduction
instead of
inter-theory link
'
'
'
silos
or
'
'
,
with no possibility of meaningful communication between the two
”
(Hettema
2012
, p. 413). And if this happens in the case of two areas as close as
chemistry and physics, “
what hope is there for areas where the difficulties are more
daunting
,
such as the medical sciences and biology
?[
paradigms
'
'
]
What happens to the unity
of science
?” (Hettema
2012
, p. 413). Here the question is: does the meaningful
communication between theories and disciplines inescapably require reduction?
Must the unification of science necessarily rely on reductive links?
Certainly, the belief that reality is a harmonious whole and not an incoherent
plurality has guided scientists throughout the history of science, and has lead them
to the search for unification. Of course, the idea of unification acted as a powerful
engine for scientific research and, for this reason, should not be abandoned. But
although in most cases unification was conceived of in terms of reduction, this is not
necessary. Our Kantian-rooted ontological pluralism does not give up the idea of
unification, but retains it under a more flexible view that follows the perspective
opened by Otto Neurath about this topic. According to this author, science is not
oriented towards a single whole, but proceeds by means of local systematizations
and, consequently, preserves a plural and always incomplete character. On this
basis, Neurath favors an idea of unification based not on hierarchical links, but
rather on a picture of science as an encyclopedia, where the connections between
theories adopt very different, stronger or weaker, forms (Neurath
1935
).
When intertheoretic relationships are studied in flesh-and-blood science, one can
see the different kinds of resources needed to establish the links. In fact, the
relations between theories are usually much more subtle and varied than what the
traditional perspective supposes: they involve limits, coarse-graining, approxima-
tions and other mathematical techniques far more complex than the simple logical
links involved in reduction. Moreover, they are not mere tools to which we turn in
response to our perceptual or technological limitations.
...
