Chemistry Reference
In-Depth Information
“
non
-
individualism in quantum mechanics
” is a result of the philosophical analysis
of the mathematical formalism (Mulder
2011
, p. 33). Here we see a clear declara-
tion of an ontological reductionism that makes chemistry a secondary discipline:
whereas electrons are really as described by quantum mechanics, their treatment in
molecular chemistry is strictly false and only pragmatically useful. In other words,
chemistry supplies only helpful tools, but the description of the “true reality” is a
task of physics. However, this is not a criticism of ontological pluralism; it is the
mere statement of a position that the ontologically pluralist perspective rejects
outright.
Independently of the particular criticisms directed by Mulder to our defense of
the ontological autonomy of chemistry, it is interesting to wonder why the author
finds it necessary to direct his efforts at arguing for the continuity between chem-
istry and physics. And this leads us to the issue of the following section.
3.6 The Fear of a Disintegrated Science
In his critical commentary on ontological pluralism, Needham conceives the
different but equally theory-dependent ontologies “
as in some sense at odds with
one another so that they can
t simply be amalgamated into one all
-
embracing
ontology
” (Needham
2006
, p. 73). On this basis, he considers our philosophical
position as an “unpalatable remedy” for facing the problem of the secondary status
of chemistry with respect to physics. Now, it is true that ontological pluralism
stands in open conflict with the metaphysical idea of an all-embracing ontology
under which any particular ontology could be subsumed. Nevertheless, this does not
amount to conceiving the different particular ontologies as being at odds with one
another. Needham seems to be afraid of a kind of ontological disintegration, which
would lead us to a fragmentary science where the different disciplines, and even the
different theories, are completely disconnected from each other. As we will argue,
the threat of fragmentation can be averted from a non-reductive idea of unification.
Although not in direct dialogue with the Kantian-rooted ontological pluralism,
this fear of fragmentation is also present in the recent topic of Hettema (
2012
),
where the author explicitly advocates for a reductionist view of the relationship
between chemistry and physics: “
The reduction of chemistry to physics is in this
sense indeed a paradigm case for the notion of reduction
” (Hettema
2012
, p. 410).
But it is surprising that, to reach this conclusion in the last sentence of his topic,
Hettema has driven us through the long road of the complexities and difficulties that
underlie the supposed reduction. In fact, according to the author, intertheoretic links
do not supply a global reduction, but only local and partial reductions of certain
particular theories of chemistry; in turn, they introduce idealizations and approxi-
mations that establish weak and discontinuous connections between theories.
Furthermore, those connections remove certain concepts from their primary context
'
