Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
3
Sato-Araki Scheme
In this section, we summarize the two attacks described by Coppersmith against
Sato-Araki scheme. We will analyze these attacks in the extended HS scheme
later.
Sato-Araki scheme [20] uses quaternion algebra over
Z
/N
Z
.Let R be a
Z
/N
Z
-
analogue of Hamilton's quaternion algebra. Here, R is defined by
R =
Z
/N
Z ·
1
Z
/N
Z ·
i
Z
/N
Z ·
j
Z
/N
Z ·
ij,
and i 2 = j 2 =
ji . R is identified with a subring of a matrix ring by
the embedding homomorphism,
1 ,ij =
R
a 0 ·
1+ a 1 ·
i + a 2 ·
j + a 3 ·
ij
(5)
a 0 + a 1
1 a 3 + a 2
[
1
a 3 + a 2
a 1
−→
M
(2 ,
Z
/N
Z
1]) .
1 a 0
1
Note that R is closed by the transpose operation. Sato-Araki scheme is described
as follows.
Key Generation
The secret key consists of the primes p, q and u
R × . The public key consists
( u T ) 1 u 1
of N and h :=
R .
Signature Generation
Let M = M T
R × randomly. We now compute
R be a message. Choose ρ
C 1 := ρ 1 M + ρ T , C 2 := u ( ρ 1 M
ρ T )
R .( C 1 , C 2 ) is a signature.
Verificat ion
If C 1 C 1 + C 2 h C 2 =4 M , then the signature is accepted, otherwise it is rejected.
3.1
Attacks against Sato-Araki Scheme
The security of Sato-Araki scheme was based on the diculty of solving an
equation over R ,
X T X + h
0mod N.
However, Coppersmith proposed two ecient attacks [4] by using a special prop-
erty of quaternion algebra, without factorizing N .
Coppersmith's first attack. The first attack proposed by Coppersmith is a
chosen message attack. For i =1 , 2 , 3, let ( C ( i 1 , C ( i 2 ) be signatures for messages
M i . The key of the attack is as follows: For i =1 , 2 , 3,
( C ( i 1 ) T u C ( i )
are symmetric matrices .
(6)
2
 
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