INSTRUMENTAL CORRECTIONS FOR A DEFINITION OF CYBERWAR - Cyberwar-Netwar: Security in the Information Age - page 16

JTF-CNO or others. At the same time this statement very clearly shows us the
vulnerabilities of further cybertargets and implies ways of possible intrusions into
adversary information infrastructures and, perhaps, into an adversary's thinking.
According to the results of the Military Operations Research Society's Workshop on
'Operations Research Methods for Information Operations: A Battlespace of the 21st
Century', which investigated as possible cybertargets the 'Critical Infrastructures and
Defending Information', and 'Human Elements in Information Operations', we should
differentiate between the human-oriented IO and the computer-oriented IO 23 . Further 17 ,
the JTF-CNO uses “three tenets of warfare - denial, disruption, and exploitation - to
guard against corruption of the system. Its only offensive mission is its intelligence
collection activities”.
And further, “…cyber warriors rely on government and private sector sources and
analysis to try to understand how a country's technological infrastructure fits together,
and to assess the threat it could pose to the integrity of US computer systems. The most
likely cyberattack targets are critical communications or energy systems; the military
systems would be a particularly high-value target." 18
There is a current opinion that the vulnerability of information systems is a mistake in
a software-code only, which can be directly used to gain access to a system or network.
For our investigation of the computer-oriented IO we will try to test how this opinion is
justified.
First of all, the state of vulnerability can be created artificially , by special computer-
oriented information operations, for instance by intellectual agents, which may:
x restructure the adversary programme independently, or
x insert a 'gate' into the programme for using data, in exactly the same way
independently, or
x manage a whole information system, where this programme is included as one of
the components
Secondly, vulnerability can be created artificially, by special human-oriented
information operations; for instance, by means of restructuring psychological intentions
or knowledge-based intentions of decision-makers or operators, when they will be forced
unconsciously to solve a problem in the direction necessary for attackers. Furthermore,
these special human-oriented information operations can be implemented in a computer
environment. On the base of these assumptions we would like to offer a clear
classification of information operations and to reveal the ways of their further possible
modification and development (see Fig. 5).
Our classification shows that all IO are undergoing serious updating under the
influence of modern R&D (see Fig 4).
First of all, and here we agree with the common opinion mentioned previously, there
are always various natural 'flaws' in adversary hardware and software. But there are also
a lot of artificial 'bugs' and 'deferred' information operations, that can attack from inside
at a given time.