Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
This mode of separation can be adapted for use with respect to both land- and,
with greater complexity, sea-based systems. Posture V is broadly comparable to
Posture IV in that it would involve the complete mating of the nuclear pit, the
weapon assembly, and the missile itself, with these completed units, however,
stored separately and away from their associated launch system. This mode of
separation is most feasible where land-based missiles are concerned, but is less
so in the case of surface ship-based systems, and is practically impossible in the
case of submarines.
Posture VI is analogous to Posture V, but applies to aircraft: the pit and the
weapon assembly are fully integrated to form complete and ready gravity bombs,
but these units are stored separately and apart from their delivery aircraft which,
being dual-use platforms, are maintained at relatively high levels of readiness.
It is difficult to assess which model of a distributed capability Indian analysts
would either approve or disapprove when they argue about the desirable
character of their evolving force posture. Statements made by Indian
policymakers suggest an inordinate, though justifiable, concern about the
survivability of their nuclear assets.
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In this context, it is important to recognize
that the fact or extent of distribution
per se
does
not
enhance survivability:
survivability is best ensured by the lack of transparency about the location of the
nuclear assets.
In order to preserve opacity while simultaneously effecting the distribution of
components, force planners would need to acquire a far larger number of the
potentially more detectable delivery systems than would actually be required by
the size of their nuclear weapons stockpile itself. Recognizing this fact, the
'Draft Doctrine of [the] National Security Advisory Board' argues that in
addition to 'mobility, dispersion and deception', the 'survivability of [India's
nuclear] forces will [have to] be enhanced by…[the presence of]…multiple
redundant systems…'
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While this argument is certainly correct, the key analytical problem identified
earlier still remains unresolved. If the only objective is to maximize
survivability, it is logical for India to focus on acquiring a larger number of
delivery systems than is strictly necessitated by the size of its weapon stockpile,
coupled with a force posture that emphasizes higher degrees of separation among
components as is exemplified, for instance, by Postures I and II. If the objective
of maximizing survivability, however, is pursued concurrently with some other
objective, for example, the ability to shift quickly from peacetime deployment to
wartime readiness as is recommended by the Draft Doctrine issued by the
National Security Advisory Board,
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then it would be logical for India to
consider alternative postures, like Postures V and VI, which incorporate even
lower degrees of separation.
A complete solution to the problem of assessing the appropriate degree of
distribution, however, will require an analysis of not only the tradeoffs between
