Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Pakistan out, and thinks in terms of generations and decades, rather than
months or years.
(4) India might underestimate Pakistani nationalism and power, and take some
action which would lead Islamabad to actually use its nuclear weapons in a
Masada-like last attempt to defend Pakistan, and if that fails, to bring India
down with Pakistan by attacking India's cities.
(5) A no less dramatic transformation in the relationship could come about if
Pakistan itself changed its priorities, putting development ahead of Kashmir
—at least for a while. This would confront India with a peculiar situation: a
former enemy seeking peace. The question is whether India would or could,
respond in a positive fashion and be willing to negotiate a long-term
settlement of the Kashmir dispute. After Kargil, this seems less likely.
(6) India could accept Pakistan's identity as an Islamic state. It could declare
that it disagreed with this identity, that it rejects such a theory of religion-
based statehood for itself, it could point to the accomplishments of a secular
democracy—and the general willingness of Muslim and other religious and
ethnic minorities to live in such a state—but it could acknowledge that on
this irreconcilable point Pakistanis chose and have the right to continue to
choose, to live a different life. It could then move to cooperate on a whole
range of shared economic, cultural, strategic, and political interests.
None of these extreme outcomes seems likely, but together they add up to a
possibility that the India-Pakistan relationship could take a dramatic and even
dangerous turn.
INDIA'S DILEMMA
The most likely outcome to this dispute is one of continuing stalemate. The
future is likely be one of hesitant movements towards dialogue, punctuated by
attempts on both sides to unilaterally press their advantage in Kashmir and in
international fora. This is a conflict that Pakistan cannot win and India cannot
lose, a true 'hurting stalemate'. Without some fundamental social or political
changes in India and Pakistan, the stalemate is likely to continue indefinitely.
Reinforcing this prospect is the fact that stalemate is more attractive to each
side than some solutions that have been put forward. From the perspective of the
Pakistan military, which has an absolute veto over any policy initiative regarding
Kashmir, the ability to tie Indian forces down in Kashmir is an important
consequence of the dispute; cynically, it could be said that Pakistan is willing to
fight India to the last Kashmiri. As long as Pakistan sees itself as militarily
disadvantaged, it will try to equalize the military balance by any means possible.
This includes the nuclear program, but also a strategy aimed at forcing India to
divert important resources to a military front (Kashmir) where the terrain and
