Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
bombing campaign against Afghanistan was about to commence. And in mid-
November, Vajpayee himself visited Washington, where he had a full round of
meetings with the president and senior administration and congressional officials.
As Ambassador Blackwill rightly pointed out, the frequency, intensity, and
transparency of Indo-American contacts had all increased dramatically. Absent
the tragic events of September 11, Blackwill observed, it would have taken years
for the two countries to reach that level of cooperation.
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No wonder many
concluded that the efforts over the previous few years to create a more robust US-
India partnership had borne fruit of the richest variety.
Yet within weeks of the September 11 attacks, cracks in the facade of Indo-
American solidarity had begun to appear. Many Indians were angered when it
became apparent that Washington, anxious to enlist allies in the war against
terrorism, sought to resurrect something of its Cold War partnership with
Pakistan. Once highly critical of the military regime run by General Pervez
Musharraf, Washington now seemed intent upon welcoming Musharraf as a full-
fledged and highly esteemed partner in the international coalition against
terrorism. The Bush administration lifted US sanctions against Islamabad,
pledged to provide generous assistance and to help Pakistan renegotiate its debt
obligations, and in countless other ways gave the Musharraf government a
legitimacy and a respectability it had never before enjoyed. 'To Indians',
observed the
Hindustan Times,
'this is like revisiting a nightmare'.
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Tempers in New Delhi rose further following the 1 October attack on the state
assembly building in the Kashmiri capital, Srinagar, which killed 38 people.
Washington displayed marked reluctance to accept India's contention that the
terrorism emanating from Afghanistan was inextricably linked to the violence in
Kashmir. Bush had promised an all-out fight against international terrorism and
the states that harbor terrorists, but he appeared both deaf and blind to Pakistani-
backed terrorism in Kashmir. At a minimum, India believed, the Bush
administration should insist that Islamabad shut down the training camps,
logistical support, and other assistance it offered the Kashmiri insurgents. Some
Indians went further, and argued that if Bush's declarations meant anything, he
would have no choice but to move against Pakistani-based organizations
implicated in the violence in the Kashmir Valley, and perhaps even to label
Pakistan itself a state sponsor of terrorism.
Rather than accepting India's assertion that Pakistan was responsible for the
Srinigar assault, however, Bush dispatched Colin Powell to the region to tell both
countries to 'cool it', an action, New Delhi believed, that equated the victim and
the criminal. The United States, many Indians concluded, was guilty of a double
standard—calling for full-throttled war against those perpetrating violence on
American shores, while ignoring terror directed against India. Strategic analyst
Brahma Chellaney spoke for many of his countrymen when he complained that
by helping Musharraf solidify his hold on power, the United States was 'building
