Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Proponents in the Bush administration of a fresh American approach to South
Asia ran up against the same conundrum that had bedeviled their predecessors:
How to recognize the reality of India's overt nuclear weapons status without
undermining US hopes of blocking the further spread of these weapons? Would
the United States undercut its hopes of keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands
of Saddam Hussein by frankly acknowledging that the international
nonproliferation regime did not envision, and made no provisions for, nuclear-
armed India and Pakistan? The inability to demonstrate that a more open
acceptance of India's nuclear weapons status would not have adverse
proliferation consequences in the Middle East or elsewhere around the world
constituted the single greatest difficulty confronting India's friends in
Washington, and largely explained why the administration did not move more
quickly to lift the Glenn sanctions.
In a perverse way, then, the greatest threat to a healthy US-India relationship as
the new Bush team settled in may have been its successes of the past few years,
and the overblown expectations that had been generated. When discussing the
relationship, there was a tendency in some quarters, both American and Indian,
toward cheerleading or boosterism. One frequently encountered exaggerated
claims for the relationship, and an automatic assumption that American and
Indian interests mesh.
Vajpayee's use of the phrase 'natural allies' to describe the US-India
partnership was a case in point. As an expression of optimism about the future,
perhaps it was a felicitous passage. But for most of the past half century, Dennis
Kux's 'estranged democracies' constituted a far more apt and accurate
description. In comparison to American ties with Europe and Japan, US-India
relations contained little of the richness, variety, or ease of communication
common to these more established US partnerships.
Partners in Arms
The September 11 attacks and the ensuing war against international terrorism
appeared to open up a new and more meaningful venue for Indo-American
collaboration. New Delhi's speedy offer of unprecedented intelligence and
military cooperation was met with gratitude and tangible marks of appreciation
from Washington. The long-delayed decision to lift the remainder of the 1998
nuclear-related sanctions was announced.
The pace of high-level visits in both directions accelerated. Jaswant Singh and
Vajpayee's national security adviser Brajesh Mishra made separate trips to
Washington in the first weeks after the attacks. Colin Powell and Donald
Rumsfeld each journeyed to New Delhi for consultations and coordination;
Rumsfeld's visit represented the first to New Delhi by an American secretary of
defense since 1995. Bush telephoned the prime minister to alert him that the US
