Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Under Primakov's influence, Russia made some attempt at resisting
unipolarity, the most splashy one being the trial balloon himed on the eve of his
December 1998 trip to India regarding the formation of a strategic triangle
comprising Russia, India and China.
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Some Indian analysts heralded this as a
welcome antidote to American power, arguing that 'the global advantage of even
a loose Moscow-New Delhi-Beijing axis would be to offer prisoners of the
unipolar system another option'.
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Although the concept went down more or less like a lead balloon, several
inferences may be drawn. Russia was clearly willing to use a 'China card' or an
'India card' for its larger objective of pressing for more economic assistance and
greater sensitivities in its surrounding security architecture from the US. Just as
equally clear were the limits to such Russian global posturing, since neither China
nor India was interested in being involved in an exclusionary effort aimed at the
US. Despite the rhetoric touting multipolarity, both India and China wanted to
stay away from initiatives which could be even remotely seen as directed against
the US.
The upshot of the Primakov experiment is the discovery that maintaining good
relations with the US takes precedence over the more ideological struggle
against unipolarity for India and China. Indeed, even for Russia, the idea appears
to have originated more from its unhappiness with the actual rewards for its
embrace of the west, rather than strategic rivalry or ideological animosity,
although the importance of nationalist sentiment cannot be ruled out. (The
August 1998 economic crisis served as a strong reminder that cooperation with
the west had not led to expected results.)
Thus for all three countries, whatever their political or ideological impulse
may be regarding US global preeminence, their preference appears to be
adjustment to the realities of unipolarity by avoiding conflict with the US. Under
these circumstances, there is little room for maneuvering, plotting or strategizing
for these states at the global level. Instead, the strategic game becomes reduced
to the bilateral level between the individual states and the leading superpower
and between themselves.
It is not surprising then that following the September 11, 2001 disaster and
America's apparent rethinking of its strategic priorities placing combating
terrorism at the top, there has been little to no resistance. While the so-called war
on terrorism certainly holds immediate and specific attractions for Russia, China
and India, support is likely to have been forthcoming even in the absence of such
interests. The choices Pakistan faced, and the decision it took to back the US, is
emblematic of this new global order.
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