Power and Strategies of Rule - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 72

A second aspect is that by agreeing to lead and operate within a rule-based international
order, the hegemonic state enhances the legitimacy of the order and its position within it. The
logic is simple. Hegemonic support for an order based on rules and institutions signals re-
straint and commitment—and this makes the order more normatively acceptable. The more
multilateral rule-based characteristics the hegemonic order has, the more likely other states
in the global system are to seek to join or cooperate with the leading state and see the op-
eration of the hegemonic order as legitimate in some fundamental sense. The more imperial
characteristics the hegemonic order has—that is, ruling through the direct and coercive use
of power—the less the order will be seen as legitimate. 43
A third aspect is the use of rules and institutions by the hegemonic state to invest in its
future power position. A durable system of rules and institutions can help to safeguard the
leading state's interests and preserve its standing even as the distribution of power slowly
shifts against it. This is true, at least, to the extent that institutional agreements have some de-
gree of stickiness—that is, if they have some independent ordering capacity. If they do, rules
and institutions can continue to provide favorable outcomes for the leading state even after
its material capacities decline in relative terms. 44 Institutions can both conserve and prolong
the power advantages of the leading state. If leaders of a hegemonic state believe that their
preeminent power position will last indefinitely—or possibly even grow greater—the attrac-
tion of establishing an institutionalized order that will last past the state's hegemonic zenith
is less compelling. But to the extent that the leaders see relative decline coming, incentives
exist for building an institutionalized order with deep roots. 45
This logic is similar to the “insurance” logic that scholars have identified in studies of
the movement toward judicial autonomy and the rule of law in democratizing states. Ruling
elites in countries moving toward democracy must worry about the protections of the politic-
al system if and when they find themselves out of office. This possibility creates incentives
for these power holders to support the rule of law, including the independence of judicial
institutions, as insurance against future contingencies. In a wide range of countries, judicial
empowerment has emerged from the strategic calculations of ruling parties that foresee their
replacement. As threatened governing elites face electoral loss, they move to lock-in their
policy preferences and protect themselves politically by strengthening courts and the consti-
tution. 46
Together, this threefold logic suggests that a leading state has motives to strike bargains
with weaker states and arrive at a settled order organized around agreed-upon rules and in-
stitutions. A rule-based environment is created in which all the participants in the order are
given tools with which to protect and advance their interests. In this way, the hegemonic or-
der is rendered stable through an ongoing confluence of interests. But to the extent that the
wider system itself is seen as legitimate, the basis of rule—and domination—shifts. Com-
pliance with the rules and institutions of the order is not based directly on calculations of