Power and Strategies of Rule - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 73

self-interest. Rather, it is based on a broader understanding that the order itself is normatively
acceptable and just. As Nico Krisch argues: “Once dominance is regarded as legitimate—and
thus turns into authority—obedience is no longer based on calculation, but on a conviction
that it is necessary and right.” 47 The rules, institutions, bargains, and diffuse reciprocity that
are manifest within the order give it legitimacy. As a result, states normatively embrace the
order—and the power of the leading state is turned into authority.
A dominant state has incentives to build an order of this sort. But the incentives are not
absolute. They operate in specific political contexts in which power and opportunities for
institutional bargains vary and evolve. We can examine these choices and trade-offs more
closely.
Strategic Choices and Trade-offs
When a dominant state is in a position to build international order, it faces choices about how
to do so. If it is the preeminent state in the global system, it will want to use its power to cre-
ate a stable and congenial international environment in which to pursue its interests. In this
situation, there are two general types of strategies with which it can assert influence and con-
trol over international order: rule through rules and rule through relationships. As a strategy
for building order, creating rules and institutions has attractions. If basic ordering rules and
institutions can be put in place, the leading state is not forced to bargain bilaterally with states
directly and continuously exercise power to control outcomes. Such an order provides for re-
latively organized and efficient rule, and it provides some future protections to the leading
state as the distribution of power shifts. But this strategy also has potential costs associated
with making binding commitments and reduced policy autonomy. So there are trade-offs and
the leading state—together with other states in the system—must make choices about how
and when to cooperate. 48
We can identify a set of general expectations about how the leading state will make these
choices. First, a dominant state will try to lock other states into institutionalized policy ori-
entations while trying to minimize its own limitations on policy autonomy and discretionary
power. This, as we noted earlier, is the game that all states are playing. All states would like
to be relatively unencumbered by rules and institutions while operating in a global system
where other states are tightly bound. So it would not be surprising to see the leading state
simultaneously agreeing to the creation of a set of institutionalized rules and seeking to ex-
empt itself or at least minimize its own exposure to the constraining effects of those rules. 49
The strategic question the leading state must ask is: how much restriction on its own
policy autonomy is needed—and worth the cost—to gain agreements from other states that
restrict their policy autonomy? The question leads to a cost-benefit calculation. Institutional-