Power and the Varieties of Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 54

for power restraint and accommodation. Likewise, I argue that America's recent post-September 11 foreign policy
misadventures show the limits—not the preeminence—of illiberal hegemony and imperiality.
47 Alexander Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2001), 4. See also Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Re-
search 8, no. 2 (1971), 81-117.
48 Doyle, Empires , 45.
49 Charles S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendency and Its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2007), 7.
50 Nexon and Wright, “What's at Stake,” 253.
51 Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).
On maritime and colonial empires, see Doyle, Empires . On the great land empires, see S. M. Eisenstadt, The Polit-
ical Science of Empires (London: Transaction Books, 1992).
52 Motyl, “Is Everything Empire?” 234.
53 This logic is explored in the literature on hegemonic stability theory. For the original statements, see Charles
Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1938 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen
Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28, no. 3 (April 1976); and Robert
Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New
York: Basic Books, 1975). For important statements and critiques, see Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic
Stability Theory,” International Organization 39, no. 4 (1985), 579-614; Arthur Stein, “The Hegemon's Dilemma:
Great Britain and the United States and the International Economic Order,” International Organization 38, no. 2
(1985), 355-86; and, more recently, Carla Norrlof, America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International
Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
54 In chapter 5, I describe this approach to order building as a milieu-oriented grand strategy, in which the lead
state attempts to influence the actions of other states by shaping the environment or strategic setting in which they
operate. A milieu-oriented grand strategy can be contrasted with a positional grand strategy, in which a leading state
seeks to more directly confront, contain, or undercut a rival great power.
55 See G. John Ikenberry, “America's Liberal Hegemony,” Current History 98 (January 1999), 23-28; and Iken-
berry, “Getting Hegemony Right,” National Interest (Spring 2001), 17-24.
56 Niall Ferguson refers to these features of liberal hegemony as “liberal empire,” manifest in nineteenth-century
British and twentieth-century American efforts to uphold rules and institutions and underwrite public goods by main-
taining peace, ensuring freedom of the seas and skies, and managing a system of international trade and finance. But
this has the effect of conflating liberal hegemonic leadership with more traditional types of empire associated with
colonialism and direct imperial rule. See Ferguson, Colossus , 8-12.
57 Steve Rosen, “An Empire, If You Can Keep It,” National Interest , no. 71 (Spring 2003), 51-61.
58 See G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organ-
ization 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990), 283-315.
59 For discussions of varieties of consent, see Michael Mann, “The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy,”
American Journal of Sociology 35, no. 3 (June 1970), 423-39. Danielle Allen proposes a continuum that ranges from
assent (actual affirmation) to acquiescence (agrees quietly but without inward affirmation) to submission (one gives
into a stronger power but maintains some resistence) to domination (consistently forced over time into submission
through surveillance and or punishment). (Private correspondence with author, October 2007.). In effect, the forms
of power exercised by a leading state in creating and enforcing order can run along a continuum from persuasion to
rewards to punishment to the use of force. The mix of coercion and consent varies accordingly.
60 For a discussion of these alternative forms of intersocietal hierarchical networks, see Nexon and Wright,
“What's at Stake.”