Power and the Varieties of Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 53

165-94; Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Mathew, “Liberal International Relations Theory: Common Threads,
Divergent Strands,” in Charles Kegley, ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the
Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin's, 1995); Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Lib-
eral Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997), 513-53; and Daniel
Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order,” Review of International
Studies 25 (Spring 1999), 179-96.
40 Michael Doyle, The Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: Norton, 1997).
41 There are a variety of related theoretical literatures that make up liberal international theory. On power
and complex interdependence, see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1977). On transnational relations and transgovernmental networks, see Thomas Risse, Bringing Transna-
tional Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995); and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2004). On the democratic peace, see Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philo-
sophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983), 205-35, 323-53. On the domestic sources of state preferences, see Moravcsik,
“Taking Preferences Seriously.” On international institutions, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation
and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Martha Fin-
nemore and Michael Barnett, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 2004). On security communities, see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Com-
munities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the
North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).
42 On the modernization theory underpinnings of the liberal tradition, see Edward Morse, Modernization and
the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976); James Rosenau, Turbulence in World
Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Craig N. Murphy,
International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance Since 1850 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994); and Deudney, Bounding Power , chap. 7. On the American embrace of liberal modernization thinking,
see David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
43 For an exploration of these reinforcing effects, see John Oneal and Bruce Russett, Triangulating Peace: Demo-
cracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2000).
44 G. John Ikenberry, “The Universal Claims of Liberal Internationalism,” unpublished paper, 2009.
45 For discussions of the distinction between empire and hegemony, see Doyle, Empires ; Herfried Munkler, Em-
pires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States (London: Polity, 2007), 40-46;
and Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright, “What's at Stake in the American Empire Debate?” American Political
Science Review 101, no. 2 (July 2007), 256-61. For skeptical views about the meaningfulness of this distinction,
see Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Holt,
2004), 30; and Ferguson, Colossus .
46 Munkler provides a challenging alternative to this topic's conception of American liberal hegemonic order.
Munkler seeks, as do I, to draw a line between “hegemonic supremacy” and “imperial domination.” In his formula-
tion, “[h]egemony is supremacy within a group of formally equal political players; imperiality, by contrast, dissolves
this—at least formal—equality and reduces subordinates to the status of client states or satellites. They stand in a
more or less recognizable dependence in relation to the centre.” In an imperial order, the rights and sovereign equal-
ity of states give way to permeable boundaries and hierarchical gradations of power and influence. Accordingly,
Munkler sees the United States presiding over a “world empire,” acting according to a “logic of imperial power”
seen most clearly in the Bush administration's post-September 11 military interventionism. Munkler, Empires , 6. In
contrast, this study sees liberal hegemony as a more elaborate form of hierarchical order in which differentiated roles
and authority, dependencies, and patron-client relations are manifest in the context of a wider system of negotiated
rules and institutions. The state system and its logic of action still operate in the background, providing mechanisms