Power and the Varieties of Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 51

Press, 1989); and Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power Values, and the Constitution of International Society
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
19 For depictions of the Westphalian state system, see F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1963); and Bull, Anarchical Society .
20 In Henry Kissinger's realist account, stable international order emerges when there is a balance among the
great powers and a shared sense of the legitimacy of the order. See Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1994).
21 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
Krasner argues that the seeming sense of novelty in the 1990s that norms of sovereignty were eroding is based on a
false historical baseline. The norms of sovereignty and nonintervention have been articulated and affirmed by states,
but these norms have never stood in the way of interventions by powerful states when it has suited their interests.
Krasner makes the important point that Westphalian norms did not emerge full blown in 1648. Indeed, the notions
of sovereignty and sovereign equality were not formally referred to in the settlement. Westphalian norms have been
contested, ignored, and abridged across the history of the states system. However, as I argue in chapter 6, what does
change in the 1990s is the emergence of new doctrines and norms of interventionism and contingent sovereignty,
which were given particular salience in the context of the rise of American unipolarity and a transforming global
security environment.
22 On the evolving norms of great power authority, see Osiander, States System of Europe . The distinction
between great and secondary powers emerged in European diplomacy during the Congress of Vienna era as dip-
lomats negotiated over processes of decision making. See Harold Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna: A Study in
Allies Unity, 1812-1822 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), 137; and Charles Webster, The Congress of Vienna,
1814-1815 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1934), 80.
23 For accounts of the Vienna settlement that emphasize its evolving practices of great-power restraint and ac-
commodation, see Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2002); and Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 188-217.
24 As one major study of the balance of power across historical systems concludes: “[A] survey of 7,500 years
of the history of international systems shows that balanced and unbalanced distributions of power are roughly
equally common. There is no iron law of history favoring either a balance of power or hegemony.” See William C.
Wohlforth, Stuart J. Kaufman, and Richard Little, “Introduction: Balance and Hierarchy in International Systems,”
in Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth, eds., The Balance of Power in World History (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 20.
States also frequently underbalance and overbalance in the face of rising states or threats. See Randall L. Schweller,
Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2008).
25 For a sweeping history of empires, see John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since
1405 (New York: Bloomsbury, 2008).
26 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Prin-
ceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), chap. 1.
27 For surveys of the logic of hierarchy in international relations, see David Lake, “Escape from the State of
Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics,” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2007), 47-79; David
Kang, “The Theoretical Roots of Hierarchy in International Relations,” Australian Journal of International Rela-
tions 58, no. 3 (September 2004), 337-52; Jack Donnelly, “Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: Amer-
ican Power and International Society,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 2 (2006), 139-70; and
Alexander Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
28 David Lake provides an important theoretical statement of hierarchy in international relations. In his formula-
tion, hierarchies are bargained relations in which the dominant state provides services—such as order, security, and