Power and the Varieties of Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 50

Unipolar World,” in John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2002); and Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance , chap. 2.
9 According to the World Bank, in 2008, the United States accounted for 20.5 percent of world GNP calculated
using purchasing price parity (PPP) and 25 percent using market exchange rates. The other leading states employing
the PPP measure were China (11.5 percent), Japan (6.5 percent), India (4.8 percent), and Germany (4.3 percent). See
World Bank, World Development Indicators , http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog (accessed July 14, 2010).
10 The World Bank records annual growth in GNP but not GNI. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that
this trend is also present in GNI.
11 Per capita GNI matters as a indicator of power capacity: the greater a country's per capita GNI, the greater
its economic and technological advancement and, everything else equal, the greater the ability of its government to
extract resources to invest in military and high-tech capacity.
12 Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Secur-
ity 28 (2003), 9.
13 Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance , chap. 2.
14 These three logics of order are ideal types. Actual historical cases of international order, as we shall see, often
combine several logics.
15 Waltz, Theory of International Politics , 95. In Hobbes's classic formulation, so long as “men live without a
common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre.” In such a condition, in-
dividuals cannot trust that their contracts will be honored and must provide for their own security, preventing the
development of a robust division of labor: “In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof
is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be im-
ported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force;
no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all,
continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan , first quote in chap. 13, para. 62.
16 Waltz, Theory of International Politics , 127. As Stephen M. Walt defines balance-of-power theory, it is “the
proposition that states will join alliances in order to avoid domination by strong powers.” Walt, “Alliance Formation
and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (1985), 5.
17 On the balance-of-power politics that marked European history and the failure of attempts to establish hege-
mony, see Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: The Politics of Power in Europe, 1494-1945 (London: Chatto
and Windus, 1963). As Herbert Butterfield writes, “the eighteenth century looked back to the Roman Empire as
a thing that must never be allowed to happen again. They realized, what the twentieth century forgot sometimes,
that there are only two alternatives: either a distribution of power to produce equilibrium or surrender to a single
universal empire like that of ancient Rome. And this development in their theory became extremely relevant when
Napoleon overthrew the balance and seemed to be creating a new Roman Empire.” Herbert Butterfield, “The Bal-
ance of Power,” in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of
International Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 142.
18 Moderate realist accounts of great-power balancing and the evolution of its practices and principles include
Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problem of Peace, 1812-22 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1957); Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems
of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); and Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European
Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). For society-of-states perspectives on the evolution of
the state system see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan,
1977); Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of Internation-
al Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Barry Buzan, From International to World Society: English
School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ian Clark,
The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University