Conclusion: The Durability of Liberal International Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 241

the various services that the liberal international order provides for capitalist trading states.
All the great powers—the old and the rising—worry about religious radicalism and failed
states. Great powers such as Russia and China do have different geopolitical interests in vari-
ous key trouble spots, such as Iran and South Asia, and so disagreement and noncooperation
over sanctions relating to nonproliferation and other security issues will not disappear. But
the opportunities for managing differences with frameworks of great-power cooperation exist
and will grow.
Overall, the forces for continuity are formidable. The declining benefits of conquest and
the collapse of rival great-power ideologies take away an old source of geopolitical conflict.
The shared sense among the major states that modernization and advancement essentially fol-
low a liberal pathway is an extraordinary source for stability. The major states all know that
fascism, communism, and theocratic dictatorship are dysfunctional as systems of rule if the
goal of the state is to grow and modernize. In effect, if a state wants to be a global power,
it will need to join the WTO. Of course, there are many forces operating in the world that
can generate upheaval and discontinuity. 4 The collapse of the global financial system and an
economic depression that triggers massive protectionism are possibilities. Terrorism and oth-
er forms of transnational violence can also trigger political panic and turmoil that would lead
governments to shut down borders and reimpose restrictions on the movement of goods and
people. But in the face of these earthquake-type events in world politics, there are deep forces
that keep the system anchored and stable.
The Rise of China and the Future of Liberal Order
What about the challenge of a rising China? The rise of China is one of the great dramas of
the twenty-first century. To some observers, we are witnessing the final end of the American
era and the gradual transition from a Western-oriented world order to one increasingly dom-
inated by Asia. The historian Niall Ferguson argues that the bloody twentieth century is in
fact a story of the “descent of the West,” a “reorientation of the world” in which the Atlant-
ic powers cede mastery of the world to the East. 5 The journalist Martin Jacques argues that
China is adopting the trappings of Western capitalism but is pioneering a very different form
of hegemony—illiberal, hierarchical, and culturally based—that amounts to a sharp move-
ment away from the Western logic of liberal modernization. China will rule the world and
will do so on very different terms. 6 Scholars have begun to explore, more generally, the pos-
sible character of a post-Western international order. 7 To be sure, China is indeed booming.
The extraordinary growth of its economy—and its active diplomacy—is already transform-
ing East Asia. Coming decades will almost certainly see further increases in Chinese power
and further expansion of its influence on the world stage. But what sort of transition will it