Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Second, the character of liberal international order itself—with or without American hege-
monic leadership—reinforces continuity. In previous chapters, I have described this postwar
liberal international order as “easy to join and hard to overturn.” The big reasons it is hard
to overturn have just been discussed. But it is also worth observing that the complex inter-
dependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding
realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups,
and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of
the system. In effect, the liberal international order has self-reinforcing features. Beyond this,
the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in
diverse regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to
various parts of this liberal system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet
empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including China, have joined the WTO.
Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integra-
tion and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. The
liberal order also provides space within for shared leadership. Again, the many multilater-
al institutions and groupings provide entry for states as they rise up and seek a leadership
role. Japan, for example, found these opportunities as it joined the GATT, the WTO, and the
G-7 and G-20 leadership grouping. And the liberal order also provides for a relatively wide
sharing of wealth and economic gains. Many countries have experienced growth and rising
incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal in-
ternational order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique characteristics
that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance.
Third, the states that are rising today do not constitute a potential united opposition bloc
to the existing order. There are so-called rising states in various regions of the world. Ch-
ina, India, Brazil, and South Africa are perhaps most prominent. Russia is also sometimes in-
cluded in this grouping of rising states. These states are all capitalist and most are democratic.
They all gain from trade and integration within the world capitalist system. They all either
are members of the WTO or seek membership in it. But they also have very diverse geopol-
itical and regional interests and agendas. They do not constitute either an economic bloc or a
geopolitical one. Their ideologies and histories are distinct. They share an interest in gaining
access to the leading institutions that govern the international system. Sometimes this creates
competition between them for influence and access. But it also orients their struggles toward
the reform and reorganization of governing institutions, not to a united effort to overturn the
underlying order.
Fourth, all the great powers have alignments of interests that will continue to bring
them together to negotiate and cooperate over the management of the system. All the great
powers—old and rising—are status quo powers. This is true if only for reasons related to nuc-
lear weapons and deterrence, but they are also all beneficiaries of an open world economy and
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