Dilemmas and Pathways of Liberal International Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 233

64 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, 15 July
2009.
65 Quoted in Ron Suskind, “Faith, Certainty, and the Presidency of George W. Bush,” New York Times Magazine ,
17 October 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/17BUSH.html (accessed 8 November 2010).
66 The U.S. Defense Department's most recent strategic planning statement makes this point: “While the United
States will remain the most powerful actor, it must increasingly cooperate with key allies and partners to build and
sustain peace and security. Whether and how rising powers fully integrate into the global system will be among
the century's defining questions, and are thus central to America's interests.” Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(February 2010), 7.
67 See surveys by Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the
World Since 1776 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997); and Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American
Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Knopf, 2001).
68 See Samuel Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1983).
69 There are, of course, political ideas and traditions in the American experience that give support for unilateral
and isolationist policies—and these flourished from the founding well into the 1930s and still exist today. But these
alternatives to multilateralism, as Jeff Legro argues, were discredited in the face of the events of World War I and II
and opened the way to internationalist and multilateral ideas and strategies. Jeff Legro, “Whence American Interna-
tionalism,” International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000), 253-89. These multilateral ideas and strategies, in turn, are
given support by the deeper American rule of law and civic national traditions.
70 This distinction is made by Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
71 Leaders of the advanced democracies have periodically made affirmations of their shared identity, rooted in
liberal governance and a commitment to the rule of law. See, for example, the Declaration of Democratic Values
issued by the G-7 countries at their 1984 summit: “We believe in a rule of law which respects and protects without
fear or favor the rights and liberties of every citizen and provides the setting in which the human spirit can develop
in freedom and diversity.” Declaration reprinted in the Washington Post , 9 June 1984, A14.
72 See Deudney and Ikenberry, “Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order.”
73 While Woodrow Wilson sought to justify American postwar internationalism on the basis of American ex-
ceptionalism and a duty to lead the world to democratic salvation, advocates of internationalism after World War II
emphasized that the United States belonged to a community of Western democracies that implied multilateral du-
ties and loyalties. See Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 114-15. For the claim that this wider Western community has reinforced American in-
ternationalism and multilateral commitments, see Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community”;
Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies ; Mary N. Hampton, The Wilsonian Impulse: U.S. Foreign Policy,
the Alliance, and German Unification (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996); and Henry R. Nau, At Home Abroad: Identity
and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). This insight about Western
community has also been used to explain the rise of NATO in the Atlantic and the absence of a similar postwar
multilateral security organization in East Asia. See Hemmer and Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia?”
International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002), 575-607.
74 John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996), 170.
75 On the ways in which American ethnic groups encourage foreign policy activism, see Tony Smith, Foreign
Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2000).
76 President George H. W. Bush, address to the U.N. General Assembly, 12 September 2002.
77 President George H. W. Bush, address to the U.N. General Assembly, 1 October 1990.