Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
world into competing spheres and geopolitical blocs. The great powers are not just rival poles
but also competing for security.
The point is that the return to multipolarity does not need to go the full distance toward a
competitive security system. To get to this outcome, the world does need to pass through the
two prior stops. But unipolarity can devolve into rival poles without fragmenting into a full-
blown divided world of security competition, and it can sustain a diffusion of power without
turning into a system of rival poles. In this sense, the return to multipolarity has several stops
along the way, each with distinct and progressively more serious implications the functioning
of an open and rule-based international order.
Variables, Linkages, and Contingencies
There are several factors, or variables, that will shape the pathway away from American-led
liberal hegemonic order. One is the actual willingness of the United States to cede author-
ity back to the international community and accommodate itself to a system of more binding
rules and institutions. Short of a radical shift in the international distribution of power, the
United States will remain the world's most powerful state for several decades to come. So
there is reason to think that other countries would be willing to see the United States play a
leading role—and provide functional services—if the terms are right. Under almost any cir-
cumstances, these terms would entail a reduction in America's hegemonic rights and priv-
ileges while operating within agreed-upon rules and institutions. The United States might
also come to believe that this renegotiated hegemonic arrangement is better than any of the
alternatives. So the question is, could the United States in fact make the political commit-
ments implicit in this renegotiated liberal international order? If there is uncertainty whether
the United States can make compromises that are necessary to move to reformed liberal he-
gemonic internationalism, there is even more uncertainty about whether it can reconcile itself
to a post-hegemonic liberal order. It might, in the end, opt for a more fragmented system in
which it builds more selective partnerships with key allies that remain tied to its provision of
security.
A second variable is the degree to which America's security capacities can be leveraged
into wider economic and political agreements. The United States has extraordinary advant-
ages in military power. Its expenditures on military capacity are equal to the rest of the
world's expenditures combined. It operates a worldwide system of alliances and security
partnerships. It “commands the commons,” in that it alone has the power to project force in
all regions of the world. This situation will not change anytime soon, even with the rapid
economic growth of countries such as China and India. The question here is, to what extent
do these advantages and disparities in military capabilities translate into bargaining power
over the wider array of global rules and institutions? If the answer is “very little”—the Un-
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