Dilemmas and Pathways of Liberal International Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 216

exclusive and preferential. The breakdown in liberal international order might be relatively
mild, whereby preferential barriers between groups of states are low but still consequential. 40
One image of such an order is the modern airline system. Airlines are divided up into com-
mercial alliances. It is easier to operate within one of these alliances, and passengers accrue
benefits from doing so. Although it is possible to move across these alliances, the incentives
discourage doing so. 41 Each of these airlines has its own hub-and-spoke routes. Alliances
have their shared clubs and facilities. Passengers are free to travel as they wish. The barriers
are not absolute. None of the airline alliances dominates the global system. Over time, travel-
ers find themselves operating within networks. In the same way, the global system could frag-
ment into rival political-economic strategic networks. States—and the groups and firms with-
in them—are able to operate both within and across these networks. But over time, political
and economic affairs become increasingly routed through these rival coalitions. The global
system is not closed or devoid of multilateral rules, but it is fragmented into subsystems of
networked relationships.
Some observers describe a coming fragmentation of the American-centered unipolar order
as a “return to multipolarity.” This is a vision of a world order organized around one dom-
inant power transforming into a system in which several powers exist and compete. The sys-
tem loses its core. The United States loses its centrality to the operation of the wider global
order. 42 But it is useful to distinguish among at least three steps along the way. 43 One step
toward multipolarity is simply a diffusion of power away from the unipolar state. Unipolar-
ity is, after all, a depiction of the distribution of power. So the distribution of power could
simply and slowly evolve toward a system in which power is more widely shared. The uni-
polar distribution of power could shift toward a system in which two or three states become
peers. Or power could diffuse even more widely into the hands of many states—perhaps a
dozen or more—that possess similar shares of world material capabilities. Regardless, what
is occurring is a redistribution of power away from the unipolar state. This does not imply
anything in particular about the character of the political formation that sits atop these shifts
in the power distribution. An open and rule-based international order might survive this shift
in power—indeed, it might be reinforced by the return of a group of leading states. A second
step away from unipolarity would involve the emergence of rival poles. This is what most ob-
servers mean by a return to multipolarity. It is not just that several states gain parity with the
United States in power capabilities, but they also become global hubs. That is, they project
power and influence and organize parts of the global system around themselves. Each pole
has its strategic partners, special relationships, and economic and political realms of influen-
ce. It might also be that each pole has its own ideology and vision of global order. A final
step away from unipolarity would involve the emergence of a balance of power and security
competition between these poles. This is the classic system of rival great powers dividing the