Dilemmas and Pathways of Liberal International Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 213

style liberal internationalism. It would be a universal order that is less tied to the United States
or the West. But also like the Wilsonian version, it would be an order in which cooperation
depended upon shared norms that fostered collective action. It remains a question whether the
norms—or ideology of liberal order—are sufficiently coherent and widely enough embraced
to make this post-hegemonic order function effectively over the long haul.
A Renegotiated American-Led Liberal Order
A second pathway is also possible in which liberal internationalism is less fully trans-
formed—this would be a reformed American-led liberal hegemonic order. In this adaptation,
the United States would renegotiate the bargains and institutions of the past decades but retain
its position as hegemonic leader. Indeed, this appears to be what the Obama administration
is attempting to do. In some sense, this is what is already happening today. In this reformed
liberal hegemonic order, the United States would continue to provide functional services for
the wider system, and in return, other countries would acquiesce in the hierarchical rules and
institutions presided over by Washington. The order would remain hierarchical but the terms
of hierarchy—the bargains and rules—would be altered in ways that are mutually acceptable
to states within the order. 32
In this reformed American-led order, the United States would give up some of its hege-
monic rights and privileges but retain others. In economic and political realms, it would yield
authority and accommodate rising states. The United States would share authority within the
reformed Bretton Woods institutions. In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the Un-
ited States would also work with other liberal market states to fashion a new post-neolib-
eral consensus on the rules and regulation of an open world economy. In security realms,
however, the United States would retain its hegemonic position. It would offer security to
other states in a worldwide system of alliances. The American economy would remain a lead-
ing source of markets and growth—even if its relative size declined. The United States would
remain positioned to support and uphold the renegotiated rules and institutions of the liberal
order. 33
In some respects, the Bush administration sought to save the American hegemonic order
by renegotiating its bargains. As we noted in chapter 6 , it envisioned the United States as
the unipolar provider of global security, upholding an international order of free and demo-
cratic states. 34 In this version, the United States would provide functional services to the
world—but in return the United States would ask for new rights and privileges. It would re-
main aloof from various realms of rule-based order. It would not join the International Crim-
inal Court and other sovereignty-restraining treaties and international agreements. It was a
new hegemonic bargain. The United States would provide security and stable order, but it
would receive special dispensation to remain unattached to the multilateral, rule-based sys-