Dilemmas and Pathways of Liberal International Order - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 214

tem. In the end, as I argued in chapter 5 , this was a bargain that the rest of the world did not
accept. The question is whether a different set of bargains might be acceptable, in which the
United States does provide functional services—particularly security protection—but also
agrees to operate within a renegotiated system of rules and institutions. The Bush administra-
tion tried to use America's unrivaled military capabilities to reduce its exposure to rule-based
order. Is it possible for the United States to increase its exposure to rule-based order as a way
to retain aspects of authority and privilege within a renegotiated hegemonic order? If so, this
would lead down a pathway of reformed American liberal hegemony.
The Obama administration has also sought to renegotiate hegemonic bargains and rebuild
the American position within the global system. It has done so in several ways. First, it has
reaffirmed the special roles and responsibilities that the United States still has in the main-
tenance of international security and order. “[T]he world must remember that it was not
simply international institutions—not just treaties and declarations—that brought stability to
a post-World War II world,” President Obama argued in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize speech.
“Whatever mistakes we have made, the plain fact is this: the United States of America has
helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and
the strength of our arms.” 35 The implication is that the world still needs the United States at
the center of the global system, where it continues to provide support for stable and cooperat-
ive relations. This message has been reinforced in statements by the administration emphasiz-
ing the importance of America's alliance partnerships and other strategic commitments. The
United States is not relinquishing its hegemonic duties. Second, the Obama administration
has reaffirmed the United States' commitment to operate within agreed-upon rules and insti-
tutions. Speaking to the doubts raised in the Bush years over this key component of the he-
gemonic bargain, Obama has asserted that “America cannot insist that others follow the rules
of the road if we refuse to follow them ourselves.” In the use of military force, “we have a
moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct.” 36 In his 2010
West Point commencement address, President Obama again claimed that “America has not
succeeded by stepping out of the currents of cooperation—we have succeeded by steering
those currents in the direction of liberty and justice.” 37 Finally, the Obama administration has
acknowledged the demand for the reform of global institutions, adapting them to new glob-
al challenges and providing a greater role for rising states. “The international order we seek
is one that can resolve the challenges of our times,” President Obama indicated in his West
Point speech. “As influence extends to more countries and capitals, we also have to build new
partnerships, and shape stronger international standards and institutions.” 38 These declara-
tions by the Obama administration suggest a desire to rehabilitate and adapt the American
hegemonic system.
There are several variants to a renegotiated hegemonic bargain. In all instances, the United
States would agree to greater sharing of authority and decision making within global security