Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
91
Senate testimony, 1949, quoted in Gardner,
Covenant with Power
, 100.
92
Charles de Gaulle,
The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle
, vol. 3,
Salvation, 1944-1946
, trans.
Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960 [1959]), 906.
93
Michael Schaller, “Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast
Asia,”
Journal of American History
69 (September 1982), 392-414.
94
Bruce Cumings, “Japan's Position in the World System,” in Andrew Gordon, ed.,
Postwar Japan as History
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 38.
95
Michael Mastanduno, “Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship,”
International Organization
52,
no. 4 (Autumn 1998), 192.
96
See also Robert Gilpin,
U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign
Direct Investment
(New York: Basic Books, 1975), chap. 6.
97
In a recent study, Carla Norrlof argues that American postwar monetary hegemony fostered cooperation and
provided benefits to other states, but it also allowed the United States to shift costs of adjustment onto these states,
costs that the United States would otherwise bear if it did not have these “positional advantages.” Carla Norrlof,
America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation
(New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010). On the relationship between American troop commitments and monetary relations, see Hubert Zim-
mermann,
Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy, and West Germany's Relations with the United States and
Britain, 1950-1971
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
98
Benjamin Cohen,
Organizing the World's Money: The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations
(New York: Basic Books, 1977), 97. Michael Mastanduno provides an illuminating characterization of the postwar
“grand bargain” between the United States and its German and Japanese allies, tracing its evolution as China has
risen and replaced these allies as a pivotal partner in the world economy. See Michael Mastanduno, “The Financial
Crisis, U.S.-China Relations, and the End of the Grand Bargain,” in Daniel Drezner and Kathleen McNamara, eds.,
The International Politics of the Financial Crisis
(forthcoming, 2010).
99
For a discussion of “voice opportunities,” see Joseph M. Grieco, “State Interests and Institutional Rule Traject-
ory: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union,”
Security
Studies
5 (Spring 1996), 176-222.
100
See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The Sources and Character of Liberal International Order,”
Review of International Studies
25, no. 2 (1999), 179-96.
101
Calder,
Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2007), 8.
102
See Steven Weber, “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO,” in Ruggie,
Multi-
lateralism Matters
, 233-92; Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case
of NATO,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed.,
The Culture of National Security
(New York: Columbia University Press,
1996), 356-71; Thomas Risse-Kappen,
Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign
Policy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Patrick,
Best Laid Plans
, chap. 9.
103
Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the
Cold War,”
International Security
21, no. 4 (Spring 1997), 61.
104
The United States did raise the idea of a multilateral security institution in Asia in the early postwar years that
would be a counterpart to NATO.
105
For explorations of America's divergent order building strategies in Asia and Europe, see Peter J. Katzenstein,
A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); and
Galia Press-Barnathan,
Organizing the World: The United States and Regional Cooperation in Asia and Europe
(New York: Routledge, 2003).
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