The Rise of the American System - Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order - page 149

the setting within which more narrow national interests are pursued. See Arnold Wolfers, “The Goals of Foreign
Policy,” in Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 67-80.
6 Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Delano Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1994), 17.
7 Roosevelt voiced these aspirations in a report to a joint congressional session on March 1, 1945, following his
return from the Yalta conference. The summit of wartime allies, FDR claimed, “ought to spell the end of the system
of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balance of power, and all the other expedi-
ents that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all these, a universal
organization in which all peace-loving Nations will finally have a chance to join.” Quoted in Robert Dallek, The
Lost Peace: Leadership in a Time of Horror and Hope (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), 59.
8 For a discussion of the Wilson and Roosevelt versions of liberal internationalism, see G. John Ikenberry, “Lib-
eral Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order,” Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 1
(March 2009), 71-87.
9 NSC-68, as published in Ernest May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC-68 (New York: St.
Martin's, 1993), 40.
10 Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000), chap. 2.
11 Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940 (New York: Mac-
millan, 1941), 261. Quoted in Leffler, “Emergence of an American Grand Strategy,” 68.
12 Wallace quotation cited in Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International
Monetary System, 1944-71 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), 34.
13 For arguments that the great midcentury struggle between an open capitalist order and various regional, aut-
arkic challengers, see Bruce Cumings, “The Seventy Years' Crisis and the Logic of Trilateralism in the New World
Order,” World Policy Journal (Spring 1991), 00-000; and Charles Maier, “The Two Postwar Eras and the Condi-
tions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe,” in In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Polit-
ical Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 4.
14 Harry S. Truman, Address on Foreign Economic Policy, Baylor University, Waco, TX, 6 March 1947.
15 Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1985), 7.
16 As Stewart Patrick notes, this vision of an open, multilateral world economy was infused with liberal inter-
nationalist principles: “In short, [the Roosevelt and Truman administrations] sought “a global economic order that
would be open —discouraging the formation of closed blocs; non-discriminatory —according participants equal ac-
cess to markets, raw materials, and fields of investment; liberal —minimizing state barriers to trade and payments;
private —dominated by private rather than state-owned enterprise; cooperative —emphasizing collaboration rather
than economic nationalism; rule-bound —delineating normative prescriptions for conduct; and governed —by inter-
national institutions embodying and enforcing shared rules.” Patrick, Best Laid Plans , 106.
17 Cordell Hull, “The Outlook for the Trade Agreements Program,” speech delivered before the 25th National
Foreign Trade Convention, New York, 1 November 1938.
18 Dean Acheson, “Bretton Woods: A Monetary Basis for Trade,” address before Economic Club of New York,
16 April 1945.
19 Carlo Maria Santoro, Diffidence and Ambition: The Intellectual Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO:
Westview, 1992), 94.
20 The culmination of this debate and the most forceful statement of the new consensus was presented in Nicholas
Spykman, America's Strategy in the World: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1942).
21 See Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold War,”
American Historical Review 48 (1984), 349-56.